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In 2016, the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (“CJPTA”) marked its tenth year 
in force. Promulgated by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, and adopted in British 
Columbia, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia, the CJPTA was developed to clarify and advance 
the law of judicial jurisdiction. In a symposium hosted by Osgoode Hall Law School, ten 
leading scholars were invited to present papers on specific questions in order to assess the 
promise of the CJPTA to meet the needs of Canadians in the years ahead and to provide 
leadership for the law in other parts of Canada. This article provides an overview of the 
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I. THE COMMON LAW AND THE CJPTA
IN 2016, THE COURT JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS TRANSFER ACT 
(“CJPTA”) marked its tenth year in force. Promulgated by the Uniform Law 
Conference of Canada (“ULCC”),1 and adopted in Saskatchewan, British 
Columbia, and Nova Scotia,2 the CJPTA was developed to clarify and advance 
the law of judicial jurisdiction. In a symposium hosted by Osgoode Hall Law 
School,3 ten leading scholars were invited to present papers on specific questions 
1. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting, 
Appendix C: Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, online: <www.ulcc.ca/images/
stories/1994_EN_pdf/1994ulcc0008_Court_Jurisdiction_Proceedings_Transfer_Act.pdf> 
at 140 [CJPTA].
2. The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SS 1997, c C-41.1 [CJPTA (SK)]; Court 
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SBC 2003, c 28 [CJPTA (BC)]; Court Jurisdiction 
and Proceedings Transfer Act, SNS 2003, c 2 (2nd Sess) [CJPTA (NS)]. The CJPTA came into 
force in 2004, 2006, and 2008 respectively in these provinces.
3. And supported by generous funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada and Lerners LLP. 
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in order to assess the promise of the CJPTA to meet the needs of Canadians in 
the years ahead and to provide leadership for the law in other parts of Canada.4 
A number of these papers have been published as articles in this Special Issue of 
the Osgoode Hall Law Journal.
This article provides an overview of the issues discussed in the symposium, 
and it places the papers that were presented in the larger context of developments 
in the law of judicial jurisdiction in Canada and internationally. Part I of this 
article summarizes the developments leading up to the symposium; it comments 
on the consideration of the differences today between the common law and the 
CJPTA contained in the first symposium paper,5 and it notes the results of an 
empirical study of the impact of the state of the law of jurisdiction on access 
to justice.6 Parts II–IV of this article then comment on the issues that were 
considered in the remaining papers, and Part V offers some further thoughts on 
the decade ahead. 
The sequence of the issues considered in the papers discussed in Parts II–VI 
of this article follow the structure of the CJPTA. The main bases of jurisdiction 
(consent and general jurisdiction), which are provided for in section 3 of the 
CJPTA, were addressed in the second, third and fourth papers of the symposium,7 
with special attention being given in the third paper to questions of access to local 
courts for consumers and other vulnerable groups.8 These issues are considered 
in Part II of this article. 
The courts’ discretion to accept jurisdiction in exceptional situations, 
which is found in section 6 of the CJPTA, was addressed in the fifth paper of 
4. Many of these papers are contained in this Special Issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal.
5. Stephen Pitel, “Six of One, Half a Dozen of the Other? Jurisdiction in Common Law 
Canada” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 63.
6. Gerard J Kennedy, “Jurisdiction Motions and Access to Justice: An Ontario Tale” (2018) 
55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 79.
7. Geneviève Saumier, “Has the CJPTA readied Canada to adopt The Hague Choice of Court 
Convention?” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 141; John McEvoy, “Conflict of Laws and 
Consumer Contracts in Canada” (Paper delivered at the CJPTA: A Decade of Progress, 
University Club of Toronto, 21 October 2016) [unpublished]; Catherine Walsh, “General 
Jurisdiction over Corporate Defendants under the CJPTA: Consistent with International 
Standards?” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 163. In comparing the CJPTA to the common 
law, Pitel incidentally considers issues (including the “real and substantial connection”) 
relating to the grounds for service outside the jurisdiction. See Pitel, supra note 5.
8. McEvoy, supra note 7.
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the symposium and in an additional paper prepared for this Special Issue;9 and 
the courts’ discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction, which is provided for 
in section 11 of the CJPTA, was addressed in the sixth paper.10 These issues are 
considered in Part III of this article. 
The mechanisms for transferring proceedings, which are provided for in Part 
3 of the CJPTA, were considered in the seventh paper;11 and questions of the 
scope of the CJPTA, which are highlighted by jurisdiction over family law matters 
were considered in the eighth paper.12 The implications of the CJPTA for the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments within Canada and elsewhere were 
considered in the ninth paper; and the implications of the CJPTA for Canada’s 
participation in international regimes for the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments were considered in the tenth paper.13 These issues are considered in 
Part IV of this article. 
As mentioned above, this article concludes with some observations about 
the future of the CJPTA. At the end of the article, there is an appendix that 
contains suggestions for drafting amendments that reflect the observations made 
on possible reforms to the CJPTA throughout this article. 
A. TWO HISTORIES: MORGUARD AND THE CJPTA 
Although the CJPTA has been in force for only a decade, its history dates back to 
its development in 1993 by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada. The path of 
its development has crisscrossed that of the common law since that time. Tracing 
9. Michael Sobkin, “Residual Discretion: The Concept of Forum of Necessity Under the 
Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 203; 
Sagi Peari, “Three Objections to Forum of Necessity: Global Access to Justice, International 
Criminal Law, and Proper Party” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 225.
10. Elizabeth Edinger, “Discretion and the CJPTA” (Paper delivered at The CJPTA: A Decade of 
Progress, University Club of Toronto, 21 October 2016) [unpublished] at 7.
11. Vaughan Black, “Cross-Border Transfers of Court Proceedings” (2018) 55:1 
Osgoode Hall LJ 239.
12. Martha Bailey, “Judicial Jurisdiction Rules for Family Law Matters” (Paper delivered at The 
CJPTA: A Decade of Progress, University Club of Toronto, 21 October 2016) [unpublished]. 
13. Angela Swan, “The Other End of the Process: Enforcement of Judgments” (Paper delivered 
at The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress, University Club of Toronto, 21 October 2016) 
[unpublished]; Joost Blom, “How might the CJPTA function in light of the current Hague 
Conference multilateral judgments convention project and, ultimately, one harmonizing 
judicial jurisdiction?” (Paper delivered at The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress, University Club 
of Toronto, 21 October 2016), “The Court Jurisdiction Proceedings Transfer Act and the Hague 
Conference’s Judgments and Jurisdiction Projects” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 257.
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the paths of the common law and the CJPTA provides an important context for 
the issues considered in the symposium. 
A quarter of a century ago, following the introduction of new rules for the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in Canada, it was suggested that the 
new rules could have implications for the law of jurisdiction.14 The Supreme Court 
of Canada had held in Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye15 that a Canadian 
court should recognize a judgment from another Canadian court where that 
court had exercised “properly restrained jurisdiction” because the standards for 
jurisdiction (exercised by the court issuing the judgment and the court enforcing 
it) should correlate with one another.16 It follows from this that the standards 
for appropriately exercised jurisdiction would also need to be reviewed to ensure 
that they would be suitable bases on which the resulting judgments could fairly 
be accorded “full faith and credit,” to use the term made familiar by US law and 
jurisprudence. 
To achieve this, the ULCC initiated a project to codify the law of jurisdiction 
“to replace the widely different jurisdictional rules currently used in Canadian 
courts with a uniform set of standards for determining jurisdiction.”17 The 
project resulted in the development of the CJPTA, a uniform Act that the ULCC 
adopted in 1994.18 Also during this period, a new book—Book X—was added 
to the Civil Code of Québec (“CCQ”) to provide codified principles for Quebec 
courts in cross-border matters. Title 3 of Book X, which contains the rules on 
jurisdiction, also came into force in 1994.19 
The new rules introduced by the Supreme Court of Canada did not present 
significant “correlation” concerns for the traditional grounds of jurisdiction—
those over local defendants and over defendants who consented to the court’s 
14. Vaughan Black, “The Other Side of Morguard: New Limits on Judicial Jurisdiction” (1993) 
22:1 Can Bus LJ 4.
15. [1990] 3 SCR 1077, 76 DLR (4th) 256 [Morguard].
16. Ibid at para 42. 
17. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting 
(Charlottetown, 1994) at 48, online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/uniform-acts-new-order/
current-uniform-acts/739-jurisdiction/civil-jurisdiction/1730-court-jurisdiction-proceedings- 
transfer-act>.
18. See Vaughan Black, Stephen GA Pitel & Michael Sobkin, Statutory Jurisdiction: An Analysis of 
the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (Toronto: Carswell, 2012).
19. Book Ten CCQ [CCQ].
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jurisdiction.20 It was already well accepted that a judgment would be enforced 
where it was issued by a court against a defendant who was a local person in 
that forum or who had consented to the court’s jurisdiction. To be fair, the 
designations of when a defendant was to be regarded as a local defendant and 
when a defendant was to be regarded as consenting raised interpretive questions, 
but in principle these grounds were and continue to be recognized widely in 
other common law countries for the purposes of enforcement. 
However, the new rules did raise the question of binding defendants from 
outside the forum who did not consent or defend. The courts were now expected 
to recognize the judgments of courts that had exercised properly restrained 
jurisdiction in these circumstances. This was said to occur when there was a 
“real and substantial connection” between the matter and the forum, which it 
was said would meet the constitutional requirements of the principles of order 
and fairness. If this was to be a correlative of the jurisdiction that the courts 
themselves exercised, it raised the question of what would qualify as a real and 
substantial connection such that it would constitute the exercise of jurisdiction 
appropriately so as to meet the constitutional requirement.21 
Until then, common law courts in Canada had exercised jurisdiction 
on the basis of lists of grounds for serving defendants outside the forum that 
were found in rules of civil procedure. The lists had long histories that were 
not well documented. The lists were similar to one another but not entirely 
uniform among the common law provinces or between common law provinces 
in Canada and other common law countries; nor were the lists based on any 
readily recognized underlying premise. Indeed, while many of the listed grounds 
seemed to relate to events giving rise to the claim that had occurred in the forum, 
some of them clearly did not.22 As was later explained, these lists were developed 
as rules for service out, not as a means of exhaustively defining the scope of 
20. These rules, however, are subject to issues arising from the archaic common law view that 
general jurisdiction over individuals was based on physical presence. See Pitel, supra note 5  
at 69. For a discussion regarding issues about general jurisdiction over corporations, see 
Walsh, supra note 7 at 167.
21. Ibid.
22. See e.g. Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 17.02(h) [RCP]. Rule 17.02(h) was 
revoked by O Reg 231/13, s 5. See also ibid, r 17.02(o). Rule 17.02(o) was revoked by O 
Reg 43/14, s 6.
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jurisdiction.23 Still, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that “they 
represent an expression of wisdom and experience drawn from the life of the 
law”24 and, on this view, should be considered carefully in any reform. 
The drafters of the CJPTA sought to articulate an underlying principle that 
was consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s pronouncement and to 
rationalize the list of grounds for service out. According to the CJPTA, a court is 
permitted to exercise jurisdiction in general where “there is a real and substantial 
connection between [the forum] … and the facts on which the proceeding 
against that person is based.”25 Having offered a definition of real and substantial 
connection, the drafters of the CJPTA also reviewed the grounds that typically 
appeared in the rules for service outside the province to determine which of them 
fit this definition. The grounds that did not fit, such as “damages sustained in the 
province”26 and “necessary or proper parties,”27 were omitted from the list to be 
included in the CJPTA. 
B. THE MUSCUTT TEST: “REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION” 
DEFINED?
As the years passed, no clarity emerged in the common law on what constituted 
a real and substantial connection despite the jurisprudence and academic 
commentary. To be fair, the disparities between the rules for service out and 
those that would meet the constitutional requirements of order and fairness 
affected only a small number of cases, and so the concerns took some time to 
develop. However, the issue came to a head in a case in which a plaintiff asked 
the courts of Ontario to exercise jurisdiction over a personal injury claim in 
respect of a traffic accident that had occurred in Alberta. The plaintiff who had 
moved from Ontario to Alberta before the accident, sought to rely upon the 
“damages sustained in the province” (i.e., Ontario) on the premise that he had 
23. See Van Breda v Village Resorts Ltd, 2010 ONCA 84 at para 72, 98 OR (3d) 721 [Van Breda 
(CA)]. It is explained that:
In Muscutt, at para. 51, we adopted a statement from Janet Walker in G.D. Watson & L. Jeffrey, 
eds., Holmested and Watson: Ontario Civil Procedure (Carswell: Toronto, 2001), at p. 17-19, 
that the grounds outlined in rule 17.02 “provide a rough guide to the kinds of cases in which 
persons outside Ontario will be regarded as subject to the jurisdiction of the Ontario courts.”
24. Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 at para 88, [2012] 1 SCR 572, LeBel J 
[Van Breda (SCC)].
25. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 3(e).
26. See discussion of former Rule 17.02(h) in supra note 22.
27. See discussion of former Rule 17.02(o) in supra note 22.
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resumed his residence in Ontario following the accident and continued to suffer 
damages while in Ontario. The defendant argued that even if Canadian courts 
had historically exercised jurisdiction on this basis, this was not the kind of real 
and substantial connection contemplated by the constitutional requirements of 
the principles of order and fairness, and the court was constitutionally incapable 
of exercising jurisdiction.28
To consider this, the Court of Appeal for Ontario convened a panel of five 
judges in 2002 to hear this appeal and four other appeals in companion cases 
raising similar issues in various circumstances.29 The Court of Appeal held that 
the rules for service ex juris were merely a rough guide to the constitutionally 
permissible bases for jurisdiction. The court formulated an eight-factor test for 
determining whether there was a real and substantial connection, which came to 
be known as the “Muscutt test.”30
The test included factual and evaluative factors that were all to be assessed, 
but in a flexible and non-hierarchical way. In particular, after assessing the 
connections between the claim and the forum and the defendant and the forum, 
courts were asked to consider the unfairness to the defendant in assuming 
jurisdiction and the unfairness to the plaintiff in not assuming jurisdiction. 
Commentators expressed concerns about the indeterminacy of the Muscutt test 
and the way in which its case-specific flexibility31 and consideration of fairness 
to each of the parties conflated the test for forum non conveniens with the test for 
28. Muscutt v Courcelles (2002), 60 OR (3d) 20, 213 DLR (4th) 577 (CA) 
[Muscutt cited to OR].
29. Ibid; Leufkens v Alba Tours International Inc (2002), 60 OR (3d) 84, 213 DLR (4th) 614 
(CA); Lemmex v Sunflight Holidays Inc (2002), 60 OR (3d) 54, 213 DLR (4th) 627 (CA); 
Sinclair v Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc (2002), 60 OR (3d) 76, 213 DLR (4th) 643 
(CA); Gajraj v DeBernardo (2002), 60 OR (3d) 68, 213 DLR (4th) 651 (CA). See also Janet 
Walker, “Beyond Real and Substantial Connection: The Muscutt Quintet” in Todd Archibald 
& Michael Cochrane, eds, Annual Review on Civil Litigation (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) 61 
[Walker, “Muscutt Quintet”].
30. The eight factors were: (1) the connection between the forum and the plaintiff’s claim; 
(2) the connection between the forum and the defendant; (3) unfairness to the defendant 
in assuming jurisdiction; (4) unfairness to the plaintiff in not assuming jurisdiction; (5) 
the involvement of other parties to the suit; (6) the court’s willingness to recognize and 
enforce an extra-provincial judgment rendered on the same jurisdictional basis; (7) whether 
the case is interprovincial or international in nature; and (8) comity and the standards of 
jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement prevailing elsewhere. See Muscutt, supra note 28 
at paras 76-107.
31. See text accompanying note 37 below.
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jurisdiction simpliciter.32 In time, in a move that might be described as “voting 
with their feet,” some provinces chose to eliminate the confusion associated with 
the common law standards by adopting the CJPTA.33 
Having come together briefly in the first part of the 1990s, and then again 
in the early 2000s, the common law and the CJPTA largely, but not entirely, 
parted ways once again. On the one hand, there continued to be debate in the 
jurisprudence about the extent to which the common law should be regarded as 
a source of interpretation for the CJPTA provisions.34 On the other hand, the 
common law continued to struggle on in its own search for clarity. 
C. MUSCUTT GIVES WAY TO VAN BREDA
In spring of 2009, the Law Commission of Ontario released a Consultation 
Paper35 seeking input on possible reform to the law of judicial jurisdiction. 
In particular, the Consultation Paper asked stakeholders for their views on the 
potential benefits of codifying the law of judicial jurisdiction in view of perceived 
uncertainty in the law, the implications for increased expense to parties in the 
preliminary stages of litigation, and the barriers this might create to access to 
justice. It further asked stakeholders for their views on the value of consistency in 
the law of jurisdiction among the superior courts of the provinces and territories 
and on the merits of adopting a statute based on the CJPTA which, at that time, 
had been implemented by British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia. 
Responses were received by a number of organizations and individuals, 
including: The Advocates’ Society; The Toronto Opinion Group; members of 
the profession, such as Alejandro Manevich of Heenan Blaikie LLP; scholars 
such as Professors Vaughan Black and Stephen Pitel, and specialists in private 
32. Walker, “Muscutt Quintet,” supra note 29; Coutu v Gauthier (Succession de), 2006 NBCA 16, 
296 NBR (2d) 34 [Coutu]; Fewer v Sayisi Dene Education Authority, 2011 NLCA 17, 305 
Nfld & PEIR 39 [Fewer].
33. In Saskatchewan, the CJPTA entered into force in 2004. See CJPTA (SK), supra note 2. 
In British Columbia, the CJPTA entered into force in 2006. See CJPTA (BC), supra note 
2. In Nova Scotia, the CJPTA entered into force in 2008. See CJPTA (NS), supra note 2. 
In Prince Edward Island, the CJPTA has not yet entered into force. See Court Jurisdiction and 
Proceedings Transfer Act, SPEI 1997, c 61. In the Yukon, the CJPTA has been enacted but has 
not yet entered into force. See Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SY 2000, c 7.
34. Pitel cites two cases as examples of this divergence of view: Bouch v Penny (Litigation 
Guardian of ), 2009 NSCA 80, 281 NSR (2d) 238 [Bouch]; Stanway v Wyeth Pharmaceuticals 
Inc, 2009 BCCA 592 at para 73, 314 DLR (4th) 618. See Pitel, supra note 5 at 66.
35. Janet Walker, “Consultation Paper: Reforming the Law of Crossborder Litigation - Judicial 
Jurisdiction” (Paper delivered to the Law Commission of Ontario, March 2009), online: 
<ssrn.com/abstract=1491169>.
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international law from other countries including Professor Richard Garnett 
(Australia) and Professor Catherine Kessedjian (France). Responders directed 
their comments to a range of issues canvassed in the consultation, but many 
agreed that there was uncertainty in the law and there were potential benefits 
of codification. 
The responses were not limited to those coming from the organizations and 
individuals answering the questions posed. In its own response of sorts, the Court 
of Appeal for Ontario took the unusual step of inviting counsel in two appeals 
that had been heard and were on reserve, those in Van Breda v Village Resorts Ltd 
and Charron v Bel Air Travel Group Ltd36 to address the possibility of changes to 
the Muscutt framework of analysis. The developments in the law that the court 
cited as prompting the review included jurisprudence and academic commentary, 
the implementation of the CJPTA, and the Consultation on Judicial Jurisdiction 
conducted in association with the Law Commission of Ontario.37 The courts had 
taken up the baton in advancing the law.
In the autumn of 2009, the Court of Appeal for Ontario convened a panel of 
five judges for the supplementary hearing of the Van Breda and Charron appeals. 
The court heard submissions from counsel and from intervenors38 for the purpose 
of deciding whether the Muscutt test should “be retained, modified, simplified 
or abandoned in favour of a different approach.”39 In the spring of 2010, the 
court released its judgment clarifying and simplifying somewhat the Muscutt 
36. Van Breda (CA), supra note 23 at para 1.
37. The court cited Coutu, supra note 32; Black v Breeden (2009), 309 DLR (4th) 708, 73 CPC 
(6th) 83 (Ont Sup Ct); Vaughan Black & Mat Brechtel, “Muscutt v. Courcelles Revisited: 
The Court of Appeal for Ontario Takes Another Look” (2009) 36:1 Adv Q 35; Vaughan 
Black & Stephen GA Pitel, “Reform of Ontario’s Law on Jurisdiction” (2009) 47:3 Can Bus 
LJ 469; Janet Walker, “Muscutt Misplaced: The Future of Forum of Necessity Jurisdiction in 
Canada” (2009) 48:1 Can Bus LJ 135 [Walker, “Forum of Necessity”]; Jean-Gabriel Castel, 
“The Uncertainty Factor in Canadian Private International Law” (2007) 52:3 McGill LJ 
555; Tanya J Monestier, “A ‘Real and Substantial’ Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada” 
(2007) 33:1 Queen’s LJ 179; Stephen GA Pitel & Cheryl D Dusten, “Lost in Transition: 
Answering the Questions Raised by the Supreme Court of Canada’s New Approach to 
Jurisdiction” (2006) 85:1 Can Bar Rev 61; Joost Blom & Elizabeth Edinger, “The Chimera 
of the Real and Substantial Connection Test” (2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev 373; Cheryl D 
Dusten & Stephen GA Pitel, “The Right Answers to Ontario’s Jurisdictional Questions: 
Dismiss, Stay or Set Service Aside” (2005) 30:3 Adv Q 297; Elizabeth Edinger, “Spar 
Aerospace: A Reconciliation of Morguard with the Traditional Framework for Determining 
Jurisdiction” (2003) 61:4 Advocate 511; Walker, “Muscutt Quintet,” supra note 29.
38. The intervenors that presented submissions were the Tourism Industry Association of 
Ontario and the Ontario Trial Lawyers Association.
39. Van Breda (CA), supra note 23 at para 50.
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test. In addition, the court acknowledged, without relying upon, a new provision 
found in the CJPTA for extending the courts’ jurisdictional reach beyond cases 
in which there was a real and substantial connection to those in which the court 
regarded it appropriate to serve as a “forum of necessity.”40
Whether the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s test would become the new 
common law standard continued to be an open question for the next two years 
while the decision was under appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the first 
year while the matter was being prepared for the hearing, and the second year 
while the decision remained on reserve. Then, in the spring of 2012, the Supreme 
Court of Canada issued its judgment41 announcing its own test. It was one that was 
ostensibly limited in scope to matters in tort; that relied upon four “presumptive 
connecting factors”; and that was analytically unrelated to any test that had come 
before, either in Canada or elsewhere. The jurisprudential development, which 
had preempted any legislative reform initiatives, such as those that might have 
followed the Law Commission of Ontario consultation, would now come to be 
assessed for its promise to clarify the law as was previously done by the CJPTA.  
The assessment has not been favourable. One concern that has arisen relates 
to the scope of the application of the ruling. The Court of Appeal for Ontario had 
noted that the Muscutt test that it had developed particularly for the “damages 
sustained in” cases had been applied to all cases of service ex juris;42 and now, 
despite the Supreme Court of Canada’s clear statement that the Van Breda test 
was intended for cases in tort,43 it too has been applied as a general standard 
for service ex juris cases across a broad range of cases. Whether the test might 
have been suitable for the limited context for which it was developed is unclear. 
However, a more general test—or a principle on which tests for specific kinds of 
40. Ibid at para 100. Justice Sharpe states: “In my view, the overriding concern for access to 
justice that motivates the assumption of jurisdiction despite inadequate connection with the 
forum should be accommodated by explicit recognition of the forum of necessity exception 
rather than by distorting the real and substantial connection test.” See also Walker, “Forum 
of Necessity,” supra note 37.
41. Van Breda (SCC), supra note 24.
42. Van Breda (CA), supra note 23 at para 51.
43. See Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42 at para 40, [2015] 3 SCR 69 [Chevron]. 
The Court explained the intended scope of the Van Breda test as follows: 
LeBel J. further—and repeatedly—confined the principles he developed in Van Breda to the 
assumption of jurisdiction in tort actions. ... “The list of presumptive connecting factors 
proposed here relates to claims in tort and issues associated with such claims. It does not 
purport to be an inventory of connecting factors covering the conditions for the assumption 
of jurisdiction over all claims known to the law” (ibid, citing Van Breda (SCC), supra note 
24 at para 85).
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cases—was needed, if not a comprehensive framework. Another concern is that 
Canada now has different jurisdictional standards applied in courts in Quebec, 
in the common law provinces that have adopted the CJPTA, and in the common 
law provinces operating under the Van Breda doctrine. The patchwork of regimes 
that prompted the initiative to simplify the law by introducing the CJPTA has 
become even more complex.
D. THE COMMON LAW WANDERS AND THE CJPTA CELEBRATES TEN 
YEARS
In light of the continuing history of inconclusive developments in the common 
law it was timely, on the tenth anniversary of the operation of the CJPTA, 
to convene a symposium to review the CJPTA and its promise to meet the 
challenges experienced in the common law provinces that have not adopted it. 
It was also timely to consider whether international trends in the law make it 
desirable to update some of the features of the CJPTA.
The symposium was held in the autumn of 2016 at Osgoode Hall Law 
School.44 Leading scholars in the field were invited to present papers on ten 
questions relating to various aspects of the law of judicial jurisdiction as follows:
1. Professor Stephen Pitel: “How different today is the law in the 
CJPTA provinces from that in the common law provinces in Canada?” 
2. Professor Geneviève Saumier: “Has the CJPTA readied Canada to 
adopt the Hague Choice of Court Convention?” 
3. Professor John McEvoy: “Is there a need for special provisions for 
consumers, workers and other vulnerable groups, such as exists in 
Québec and the European Union?” 
4. Professor Catherine Walsh: “Are the standards for ordinary 
residence for businesses consistent with the current national and 
international standards?” 
5. Michael Sobkin: “Is there a need for residual jurisdiction to 
promote access to justice for plaintiffs who cannot sue elsewhere 
and to enable other parties to be joined as necessary? What is the 
appropriate standard?” 
6. Professor Elizabeth Edinger: “Is there a continuing need for 
discretion to decline jurisdiction? Do we have the right formula 
for exercising discretion, and are we considering the right factors?” 
44. The symposium, The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress, was organized and moderated by Professor 
Janet Walker, with vital assistance in funding applications and logistics provided by Dr. Sagi 
Peari and Gerard Kennedy. 
WALKER,  JUDICIAL JURISDICTION IN CANADA 21
7. Professor Vaughan Black: “Is the transfer of proceedings 
mechanism working well?” 
8. Professor Martha Bailey: “Should there be a consolidated set of 
rules for family law matters, such as exists in Québec for family law 
matters? What kinds of proceedings would it include?” 
9. Professor Angela Swan: “Will the judgments of courts exercising 
jurisdiction pursuant to the CJPTA be enforceable in other provinces 
and countries (and are either compatible with Morguard Investments 
Ltd v De Savoye)?” 
10. Professor Joost Blom: “How might the CJPTA function in light of 
the current Hague Conference multilateral judgments convention 
project and, ultimately, one harmonizing judicial jurisdiction?” 
E. HOW DIFFERENT TODAY IS THE COMMON LAW FROM THE CJPTA?
A basic question that arises from the two histories of jurisdictional law in common 
law Canada is the extent to which the two regimes differ in practice. In his 
article, addressing the question “How different today is the law in the CJPTA 
provinces from that in the common law provinces in Canada?” Professor Pitel 
identified two main differences, the first of which was that the CJPTA is clear in 
its adoption of “ordinary residence” for general jurisdiction over natural persons 
and in setting out detailed provisions for the ordinary residence of legal persons, 
where the common law standard historically has been one of physical presence. 
In response, it might be asked whether, in fact, the common law continues 
to espouse physical presence as a standard for jurisdiction over individuals. This 
is unlikely to be examined directly, because it would require a case in which 
jurisdiction had been exercised over a defendant on the basis of presence alone—
in such a case, a court would be likely to decline jurisdiction in any event on 
the basis of forum non conveniens. Accordingly, guidance in the jurisprudence 
on this question is likely in future judgments to continue to be limited to 
comments in obiter.45 Furthermore, it is generally possible to serve a defendant 
locally at the defendant’s address even when the defendant is abroad.46 Therefore, 
it might be said that general jurisdiction over individuals in the common law 
45. In Chevron, the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the use of service in cases of the 
enforcement of foreign judgments, but this was explained in part as a consequence of the 
fact that the court was not exercising adjudicatory jurisdiction. See Chevron, supra note 43 
at paras 44-48.
46. See e.g. RCP, supra note 22, r 16.03(5).
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provinces that have not adopted the CJPTA is, for all practical purposes, based 
on the residence of the defendant and not, as the traditional treatises suggest, 
the defendant’s presence. Nevertheless, as Professor Pitel observed, the CJPTA is 
different from the common law in that it is explicit in providing standards for 
general jurisdiction for natural persons and for legal persons that are based on 
ordinary residence.
Second, Professor Pitel noted a number of differences between the CJPTA 
and the common law in the connecting factors for service ex juris cases. He first 
considered the continuing uncertainty over whether the grounds listed in the 
CJPTA are exhaustive, or whether they permit service on analogous grounds.47 
This may not reflect a difference from the common law,48 but the way in which 
the scope of jurisdiction is defined could benefit from greater clarity in any event.
Then, turning to specific grounds, Professor Pitel noted that the intended 
performance of a contract in the forum, and consumer transactions that had 
been solicited in the forum were included in the CJPTA but did not exist in the 
rules for service outside the province. Again, whether these represent significant 
practical differences between the jurisdictional standards may be debated in that 
functional equivalents of the CJPTA grounds may be found, for example, in the 
breach of contract in the forum ground listed in the rules for service outside 
Ontario,49 and the jurisdictional provisions in consumer protection legislation.50 
In addition, Professor Pitel noted the re-introduction in Van Breda of the 
long abandoned “contract made in the jurisdiction” by the Supreme Court of 
Canada that was not included in the CJPTA. On subsequent review by the 
Supreme Court of Canada, this factor has since been questioned,51 and closer 
inspection of the intended application of this ground suggests that it was a variant 
on the “related claims and parties” connection that was omitted, first from the 
CJPTA and then from the common law.52 Finally, Professor Pitel observed that 
the restriction on jurisdiction to pronounce on title to foreign immovables exists 
in the common law but was not adopted in the CJPTA.53 
47. Pitel, supra note 5 at 64.
48. As discussed further in Part II.
49. RCP, supra note 22, r 17.02(f )(iv), Schedule A, s 100.
50. Consumer Protection Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 30, Schedule A [CPA, 2002].    
51. See Lapointe Rosenstein Marchand Melançon LLP v Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, 2016 
SCC 30 at para 88, [2016] 1 SCR 851. Justice Côté (in the dissent) states, “I am aware 
of no conflicts regime that accepts that a forum has subject matter jurisdiction over a 
claim in tort simply because a contract “connected with” that claim was formed there” 
[emphasis in original].
52. See notes 113-114 and accompanying text below. 
53. Pitel, supra note 5 at 76. See also the examples noted in supra note 34.
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A simple listing of the differences in service ex juris jurisdiction in this way 
might make the concerns that these differences raise sound marginal or incidental; 
but differences, however small, can reflect significant barriers to access to the 
courts for those whose cases are affected. Moreover, as Professor Pitel noted, even 
if the differences affect only a minority of cases, a statutory regime would make 
the law “more available and more knowable” to the general public and that would 
be of considerable benefit.54 In this regard, after the symposium was held, a further 
study was conducted by Gerard Kennedy to examine empirically the costs of this 
uncertainty by assessing trends in jurisdictional motions and examining the costs 
awarded in them. That study is published in this Special Issue.55
Finally, in addition to the immediate benefits of greater clarity outlined by 
Professor Pitel, any desired reform to the law would benefit from a clear and 
common starting point that enables the law to be considered as a whole and not 
in piecemeal fashion as occurs in the case law. 
II. CONSENT-BASED JURISDICTION AND GENERAL 
JURISDICTION
The first substantive provision of the CJPTA, section 3, sets out an exhaustive 
list of five bases on which a court may exercise territorial competence over in 
personam proceedings. The first three of these bases relate to the consent of the 
parties to the court’s jurisdiction.
A. ATTORNMENT
Although not addressed directly in any of the symposium papers, for the 
sake of a complete analysis, it is worth noting the first two of the bases of 
jurisdiction relying on the parties’ consent, which may be described as forms of 
“appearance,” “submission,” or “attornment.”56 They are set out in section 3 of 
the CJPTA as follows: 
(a) that person is the plaintiff in another proceeding in the court to which the 
proceeding in question is a counterclaim,
(b) during the course of the proceeding that person submits to the court’s 
jurisdiction.57
54. Ibid.
55. Kennedy, supra note 6.
56. Janet Walker, Canadian Conflict of Laws, 6th ed (Markham, Lexis Nexis: 2005) at 11.2.
57. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 3(a), (b).
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These two bases of jurisdiction are widely accepted and generally consistent 
with the common law in Canada and with the CCQ. Although there have 
been interpretive questions about the operation of the bases,58 the debates 
have not undermined the underlying certainty of the base as codified in the 
CJPTA. Nevertheless, the addition of the phrase “by defending the merits of 
the proceeding” could provide guidance on the means by which these bases 
commonly indicated.59
B. JURISDICTION AGREEMENTS AND NEGATIVE JURISDICTION 
PROVISIONS
The third basis of jurisdiction provided in section 3 of the CJPTA reads as follows:
(c) there is an agreement between the plaintiff and that person to the effect that the 
court has jurisdiction in the proceeding.60
Like the first two provisions, this provision is in principle clear and 
uncontroversial. However, it requires further detail to meet the current needs of 
cross-border litigation in commercial matters. This is considered in the article 
58. In the first form of attornment or submission listed in the CJPTA—by commencing a 
proceeding in the court—the plaintiff, who is also the defendant by counterclaim, has 
waived any right to object to that court’s jurisdiction. See ibid, s 3(a). Questions that can 
arise include: 
1. Does the subject matter of the counterclaim need to be related to the main claim so 
as to operate to waive the right of the counterclaim’s defendant to object to the court’s 
jurisdiction?; and 
2. Does such a waiver apply to all plaintiffs, including those such as foreign states who 
would otherwise be immune from the court’s jurisdiction? 
 In the second form of attornment, the defendant has waived any basis that it might have 
to object by appearing in the proceeding to defend against the merits. See ibid, s 3(b). 
Many of the questions that have arisen in particular cases about this have related to the 
accepted view that the defendant should be permitted to appear in the proceedings for the 
purpose of challenging the court’s jurisdiction without being regarded as having attorned. 
To enable defendants to challenge jurisdiction without being regarded as having attorned, 
courts in many common law countries have arranged their processes to permit jurisdictional 
challenges to be heard before a statement of defence is submitted. Nevertheless, debate in 
the jurisprudence over the demarcation between jurisdictional challenges and defenses on 
the merits has arisen in enforcement actions. This is particularly true where there is overlap 
between these two phases in the procedure in the forum of the rendering court, and where 
there is an obligation to take steps, for example, by mandatory case management deadlines.
59. See Appendix: Court Jurisdiction Act—Suggested Drafting Amendments, below, s3(1)
(b) [Appendix].
60. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 3(c).
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prepared by Geneviève Saumier on the question: “Has the CJPTA readied Canada 
to adopt The Hague Choice of Court Convention?”61 
The Hague Choice of Court Convention seeks to ensure the effectiveness of 
choice of court agreements between businesses in international commercial 
agreements. It came into force in 2015 and it includes among its signatories the 
United States, Mexico, and the European Union.62 The ULCC adopted a model 
implementation statute in 2010,63 which has since been adopted in Ontario, 
subject to ratification by Canada, and may be adopted in other provinces. 
As Professor Saumier explains in her article, the current provision of the CJPTA, 
which codifies the common law, fails to address two critical features of the Choice 
of Court Convention. 
The first of these deficiencies is that the CJPTA contains no negative 
jurisdiction provision. While the CJPTA establishes that the court may exercise 
jurisdiction where there is an agreement between the parties nominating the 
courts of the forum, it does not include the corollary provision that the court 
may not exercise jurisdiction where the parties have agreed that some other court 
has exclusive exercise jurisdiction. In many situations, the benefits in planning 
for dispute resolution of achieving certainty of access to suitable fora apply 
equally to achieving certainty of protection from unsuitable fora. Despite recent 
jurisprudence recognizing these benefits,64 the historic resistance of common law 
courts to the idea that the parties might exclude their jurisdiction by agreement 
has prevented the common law from embracing a clear position on this.65 
In contrast, the CCQ contains a clear provision for negative jurisdiction. 
Article 3148, which states that “[i]n personal actions of a patrimonial nature, 
Québec authorities have jurisdiction [in specified situations],” finishes with the 
following paragraph: 
However, Québec authorities have no jurisdiction where the parties have chosen 
by agreement to submit the present or future disputes between themselves relating 
61. Saumier, supra note 7.
62. Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, 30 June 2005, Hague 
Conference on Private International Law (entered into force 1 October 2015), online: <www.
hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98> [Choice of Court Convention].
63. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements Act (2010), Uniform Law Conference of 
Canada, online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/uniform-acts-new-order/current-uniform-acts/645-hague-
convention-choice-of-court/1404-hague-convention-on-choice-of-court-agreements-act>.
64. Expedition Helicopters Inc v Honeywell Inc, 2010 ONCA 351 at para 11, 100 OR (3d) 241.
65. Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board Ship or Vessel Eleftheria v The Eleftheria (1969), [1970] 
P 94 at 99-100, [1969] 2 WLR 1073; ZI Pompey Industrie v ECU-Line NV, 2003 SCC 27 at 
para 21, [2003] 1 SCR 450.
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to a specific legal relationship to a foreign authority or to an arbitrator, unless the 
defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the Québec authority.66
As Professor Saumier concluded in her paper, the adoption of the Choice of 
Court Convention would require the replacement of the ad hoc judicial discretion 
that currently characterizes the common law with a clear obligation to decline 
jurisdiction where the parties, by agreement, have chosen to submit their disputes 
to another court. 
Whether or not the eventual adoption of the Choice of Court Convention 
across the common law provinces in Canada necessitates a change in the law, 
the fact that Canada’s major trading partners—the United States, the European 
Union, and Mexico—are signatories is good reason to bring the law in Canada 
into line with this emerging international standard. In the CJPTA, a negative 
jurisdiction provision modelled on the provision contained in the Civil Code of 
Québec, could be added following the positive jurisdiction provisions currently 
found in section 3 of the CJPTA.67 
C. VALIDITY AND EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE AND NON-EXCLUSIVE 
AGREEMENTS
The obligation to respect exclusive jurisdiction agreements favouring other fora 
may be the most significant point in issue, but four further points affecting 
jurisdiction agreements are worth considering in assessing the CJPTA. 
First, one reason why common law courts have been reluctant to recognize 
the ousting of their jurisdiction by the parties’ agreement is the need to 
ensure that their jurisdiction is excluded only in cases where the jurisdiction 
agreement is valid. This concern is addressed in the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration for cases in which the parties have entered 
into an arbitration agreement by providing that the court shall refer the parties 
to arbitration “unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed.”68 A clarification of this point could be achieved 
by adding the word “valid” to the text of the CJPTA.69
66. CCQ, supra note 19, art 3148.
67. See Appendix, below, s 3(2).
68. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration 1985, with Amendments as Adopted in 2008, (Vienna: 
United Nations, 2006), art 8(1).
69. See Appendix, below, s 3(2).
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Second, the Choice of Court Convention makes mandatory the exercise 
of jurisdiction by the court nominated in the jurisdiction agreement.70 
Jurisdiction-mandating provisions can interfere with the common law courts’ 
ability to prevent abuse. In one Federal Court of Appeal decision, the court 
considered a mandatory jurisdiction provision of a federal statute71 that appeared 
to override a jurisdiction agreement. The court held that the statute could mandate 
the existence of jurisdiction, but it could not oust the court’s inherent authority72 
to control its own process and exercise discretion to decline to hear the case.73 
However, since the jurisdiction mandating provision in the CJPTA supports 
rather than overrides party autonomy it would seem rare for a situation to arise 
in which a Canadian court would nevertheless wish to decline jurisdiction.
Third, the Choice of Court Convention applies only to exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements,74 and does not provide for non-exclusive or “permissive” jurisdiction 
agreements. It might be just as important to support the parties’ choice to 
nominate a court while maintaining the flexibility to submit a dispute to another 
forum as it is to support their choice to submit their agreements exclusively to 
one court. Accommodating this would affect neither the jurisdiction-removing 
nor the jurisdiction-mandating provisions. However, a permissive jurisdiction 
agreement could be added to the factors currently found in the CJPTA for 
determining whether a court should decline jurisdiction if asked to do so.75 
Should the CJPTA provide for the exercise of discretion in cases involving 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements, it would be helpful for the statute to 
indicate that the exercise of discretion, either to accept jurisdiction or to decline 
jurisdiction, should be guided by a presumption in favour of the forum selected 
by the parties. A provision to this effect is including in the Suggested Drafting 
Amendments in the Appendix of this article.
D. PROTECTIONS FOR CONSUMERS, WORKERS, AND OTHER 
VULNERABLE PARTIES
A fourth issue affecting jurisdiction agreements in the CJPTA concerns contracts 
with consumers, workers, and insured persons. Just as it is important to support 
party autonomy in interpreting jurisdiction agreements, so too is it important 
70. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 62, art 5(2).
71. Marine Liability Act, SC 2001, c 6, s 46.
72. See e.g. Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C-43, s 106.
73. OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp, 2006 FCA 284, [2007] 2 FCR 733.
74. Although the Choice of Court Convention deems jurisdiction agreements to be exclusive unless 
the parties have expressly provided otherwise.
75. See Appendix, below, s 8(3).
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to protect weaker parties. In addition to the limits on the scope of the Choice of 
Court Convention noted above, article 2(1) of the Convention provides that:
This Convention shall not apply to exclusive choice of court agreements -
a) to which a natural person acting primarily for personal, family or household 
purposes (a consumer) is a party;
b) relating to contracts of employment, including collective agreements.76
The Choice of Court Convention does not apply to jurisdiction agreements 
involving consumers and workers. If the CJPTA came to include a negative 
jurisdiction clause as recommended above and the CJPTA was not restricted in 
its scope to commercial contracts, it would need to specify that the negative 
jurisdiction provision did not apply to contracts involving consumers, workers, 
and other vulnerable groups in order to ensure that they have access to courts in 
their home jurisdictions.
Provisions protecting consumers, workers, and insured persons from 
purported waiver of access to their home courts are found in CCQ articles 
3149 and 3150: 
3149. A Québec authority also has jurisdiction to hear an action involving a 
consumer contract or a contract of employment if the consumer or worker has his 
domicile or residence in Québec; the waiver of such jurisdiction by the consumer or 
worker may not be set up against him.
3150. A Québec authority has jurisdiction hear an action based on a contract 
of insurance where the holder, the insured or the beneficiary of the contract is 
domiciled resident in Québec, the contract is related to an insurable interest situated 
in Québec or the loss took place in Québec.77
And as mentioned above, the CJPTA provides for jurisdiction in matters 
concerning contractual obligations: 
10(e)(iii) the contract 
  (A) is for the purchase of property, services or both, for use other than in 
the course of the purchaser’s trade or profession, and
  (B) resulted from a solicitation of business in [enacting province or 
territory] by or on behalf of the seller.78
76. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 62, art 2(1).
77. CCQ, supra note 19, arts 3149-50.
78. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 10(e)(iii).
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In his symposium paper, Professor John McEvoy79 considered whether 
there was a need for special provisions for consumers, workers, and other 
vulnerable groups, such as those which exist in Quebec and the European Union? 
He described the effect of a wide range of discrete provincial enactments that 
displaced agreements purporting to waive consumers’ right to access their local 
courts.80 Noting that the CJPTA contains special provision in section 10 for 
consumer transactions, he suggested that the provision could be expanded to 
include all consumer claims whether framed in contract or otherwise. 
It might be added that such a provision could be extended to apply to 
claims by workers and insured parties. A new subsection could provide that a 
real and substantial connection to the forum would be presumed to exist if the 
proceeding concerns:
6(f )(i) the purchase of goods, services or both, for use other than in the course of 
the purchaser’s trade or profession, and resulted from a solicitation of business in 
[enacting province or territory] by or on behalf of the seller;
(ii) the employment of a worker whose ordinary residence is in [enacting province 
or territory];
(iii) insurance where the holder, the insured or the beneficiary is ordinarily resident 
in [enacting province or territory], the contract is related to [enacting province or 
territory] or the loss occurred in [enacting province or territory].81
79. See McEvoy, supra note 7. A further issue about the application of the CJPTA to family law 
matters is addressed in the paper by Martha Bailey. See Bailey, supra note 12. This issue is 
discussed below in Part IV.
80. Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, SBC 2004, c 2, s 3; Fair Trading Act, RSA 
2000, c F-2, s 2(1); The Consumer Protection and Business Practices Act, SS 2014, c C-30.2, 
s 15(1); Consumer Protection Act, CCSM c C200, ss 96, 96.1; CPA, 2002, supra note 50, 
s 7(1) (Ontario); Consumer Protection Act, RSNS 1989, c 92, s 21; Consumer Protection 
and Business Practices Act, SNL 2009, c C-31.1, s 3(1); Consumer Protection Act, RSY 2002, 
c 40, s 88; Consumer Protection Act, RSNWT 1988, c C-17, s 107; Consumer Protection Act, 
RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c C-17, s 107.
81. See Appendix, below, s 6(f ). Professor McEvoy also describes the provisions of the more 
detailed ULCC draft statute. For more information on the draft statute, see the Uniform 
Law Conference of Canada, “Civil Section Minutes 2003”, Proceedings of the Eighty-Fifth 
Annual Meeting (Fredericton, 10-14 August 2003) at item 10, online: <www.ulcc.ca/
en/annual-meetings/284-2003-fredericton-nb/civil-section-minutes-and-resolutions-
2003/102-civil-section-minutes-2003>; Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Civil Law 
Section “Jurisdiction and Consumer Protection in Electronic Commerce Project: Report 
of the Working Group” (Fredericton, 10-14 August 2003), online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/
annual-meetings/288-2003-fredericton-nb/civil-section-documents/1789-jurisdiction-and-
consumer-protection-in-electronic-commerce-report-2003>; Uniform Law Conference 
of Canada, “Civil Section Minutes 2004”, Proceedings of the Eighty-Sixth Annual Meeting 
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL30
In 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the question of forum 
selection agreements in consumer contracts in the context of the CJPTA. The 
case involved a claim for misuse by Facebook of a subscriber’s image.82 Since the 
CJPTA does not provide for the negative jurisdiction aspect of forum selection 
agreements, the Court applied the strong cause test that it had adopted many 
years earlier and adapted it to the consumer context. In the instant case, the Court 
held that the agreement was valid, clear and enforceable and that it applied to the 
cause of action before the court, but that a number of factors cumulatively served 
as strong cause to set aside the jurisdiction agreement. These factors included that 
the clause was found in a consumer contract of adhesion between an individual 
consumer and a large corporation and the claim was based on a statutory cause of 
action protecting quasi-constitutional privacy rights. The decision was rendered 
by a majority of 4 to 3 in which 6 of the 7 judges agreed nevertheless to the 
application of a test developed for commercial contracts to consumer contracts, 
and in which the dissenting judges would have upheld the waiver of the right to 
access local courts in a consumer contract of adhesion.
E. STANDARDS FOR GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER BUSINESSES
Turning from consent-based jurisdiction, to the second main basis of jurisdiction 
(ordinary residence), section 3 of the CJPTA provides that a court has jurisdiction 
against a person only if: 
(d) that person is ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory] at the time of 
the commencement of the proceeding.83
In understanding this aspect of jurisdiction, it is helpful to use the distinction 
found in the US jurisprudence between general and specific jurisdiction.84 
Where a court has general jurisdiction, it may decide claims against local persons 
regardless of where the claims have arisen. In contrast, where a court has specific 
jurisdiction, it may decide claims that have strong connections to the forum, 
against all persons regardless of where they are based. 
The law of general jurisdiction has evolved considerably in recent years. 
Some of this evolution is reflected in the CJPTA and some of it has occurred 
since the drafting of the CJPTA. One development in the law that is reflected 
(Regina, August 2004) at 67, Appendix G at 183. This replicates in a specialized statute 
much of the provisions of more general application found in the CJPTA.
82. See Douez v Facebook, Inc, 2017 SCC 33, 411 DLR (4th) 434.
83. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 3(d).
84. As explained in Walsh, supra note 7 at 192.
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in the CJPTA is the description of general jurisdiction as a function of ordinary 
residence rather than presence.85 Historically, presence was used as the basis for 
determining general jurisdiction in the common law standard. It was readily 
demonstrated by service of the defendant with the notice of proceeding in the 
forum. Service of process was said to resemble a symbolic arrest by which the 
physical power of the local sovereign over the defendant supported the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the local courts.86 
The risk of unfair assertions of jurisdiction over persons who are on a brief 
visit to the forum for reasons unrelated to the claim has become clearer with the 
increased mobility of ordinary individuals and their routine engagement in online 
transactions and communications. Some of the potential for abuse in the exercise 
of jurisdiction over those temporarily present in the forum is addressed by the 
likelihood that Canadian courts would exercise discretion to decline jurisdiction 
over non-consenting defendants with no connection to the jurisdiction in respect 
of matters that have little connection to the jurisdiction. This makes it unlikely 
that there would be an opportunity for a clarification of the common law. 
The civil law has never suffered from this confusion: General jurisdiction has 
always been based on the domicile or the residence of the defendant. Similarly, 
the CJPTA avoids this confusion by adopting “ordinary residence” as its basis for 
general jurisdiction over defendants. Apart from interpretive issues, the ordinary 
residence standard of the CJPTA is far clearer and more widely accepted than the 
common law. Indeed, it is arguable that, for all practical purposes, the common 
law standard of presence operates on the basis of the defendants’ ordinary 
residence even in the provinces that have not adopted the CJPTA. Accordingly, 
the adoption of the CJPTA ordinary residence standard may be sufficient to clarify 
this de facto situation and bring the law in line with prevailing international 
standards for claims against individuals. 
However, as Catherine Walsh discusses in her article, the international 
standards for general jurisdiction for legal persons (corporations, partnerships, 
and unincorporated associations) have evolved since the promulgation of the 
CJPTA, and in both the common law provinces and the CJPTA provinces, the 
legal standard for general jurisdiction over businesses has fallen behind.87 With 
regard to the law of general jurisdiction, Professor Walsh was asked to consider 
“Are the standards for ordinary residence for businesses consistent with the 
85. See RCP, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
86. International Shoe v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945) at 316.
87. Walsh, supra note 7.
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current national and international standards?”88 In the CJPTA, the provisions 
for ordinary residence are both detailed and broad in scope for corporations, 
partnerships and unincorporated associations.89The provisions for corporations 
include, uncontroversially, the place of incorporation and the place of central 
management. However, added to these bases are: the place where a corporation 
has a place of business, and the place where the corporation has an address or an 
agent for service of process.90 
These latter two bases are out of step with prevailing norms elsewhere. In the 
European Union, under the Brussels I Regulation, general jurisdiction is based on 
a person’s domicile, and a legal person is domiciled at the place where it has its: 
(a) statutory seat; (b) central administration; or (c) principal place of business.91 
Similarly, the 2017 draft Hague judgments convention, which uses “habitual 
residence” for general jurisdiction, provides that an entity may be resident 
“(a) where it has its statutory seat; (b) under whose law it was incorporated or 
formed; (c) where it has its central administration; or (d) where it has its principal 
place of business.”92 
In Quebec, where general jurisdiction is based on domicile, a legal person 
that is not incorporated in Quebec is subject to the general jurisdiction of the 
Quebec courts only if it has an establishment in Quebec, and the dispute relates 
to its activities in Quebec. One may question whether this restriction renders 
the provision one of specific jurisdiction (i.e., one based on connections between 
the matter and the forum) rather than general jurisdiction. If so, by implication, 
the only basis for general jurisdiction in Quebec is that of incorporation in the 
province, making the scope of general jurisdiction over legal persons in Quebec 
the narrowest of all by far.
88. Walsh, supra, note 7.
89. It is unclear that there is need, in what is otherwise a generally concise and open-textured 
statute, for specific provisions for partnerships and unincorporated associations. Accordingly, 
the suggested drafting amendments combine them into a single provision for “legal persons.” 
See Appendix, below, s 5.
90. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 7. 
91. EC, Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement in civil and commercial matters, [2001] OJ, L12 [Brussels I Regulation] 
replaced by EC, Regulation No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (recast), [2012] OJ, L351/1 [Recast Brussels I] for proceedings instituted 
on or after January Vol 10, 2015.
92. November 2017 Draft Convention, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Special 
Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, art 2, online: 
<assets.hcch.net/docs/2f0e08f1-c498-4d15-9dd4-b902ec3902fc.pdf>.
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Turning to the common law, in Canada, there is considerable jurisprudence 
on the “carrying on business” basis for general jurisdiction. Much of this 
jurisprudence would suggest that the courts are inclined where there is such a 
tenuous connection to consider whether, as is required in Quebec, the business 
carried on gave rise to the claim. As this is often the case, there is scant opportunity 
for clarification in the jurisprudence of the scope of general jurisdiction. 
In contrast, in the United States, where “doing business” jurisdiction has, 
over the years, proved controversially broad,93 in 2014 the US Supreme Court 
held that general jurisdiction over corporations is confined to the place where the 
corporation may be regarded as “at home.” This, in turn, is limited to the place of 
incorporation and principal place of business.94
Thus, it may be suggested that the law of general jurisdiction over corporations 
is currently an unfortunate ill-fitting series of standards: too broad in the CJPTA; 
oddly narrow in Quebec; and frustratingly unclear in the common law provinces. 
Now that the standards in the European Union, the United States, and at The 
Hague Conference are converging on a clear formulation within these extremes, 
it could be helpful to draw on this collective wisdom to update the standards 
in the CJPTA by replacing the final two provisions for ordinary residence with 
“where the corporation has its principal place of business.” These suggestions 
are reflected in the Suggested Drafting Amendments found in the Appendix 
of this article.95
Before turning to questions of discretion in the exercise of jurisdiction, 
it is worth noting for the sake of completeness the third main basis of jurisdiction—
that of real and substantial connection. The electronic ink on this common law 
standard has flowed liberally and continuously since the Morguard decision 
was released more than a quarter century ago.96 The fundamental conceptual 
challenges experienced with it in the common law in Canada may be contrasted 
with the formulation that is found in the CJPTA, which reads as follows:
3.  A court has territorial competence in a proceeding that is brought against a 
person only if…
93. Hague Conference on Private International Law, “Some reflections on the present state 
of negotiations on the judgments protect in the context of the future work programme 
of the conference,” Prel Doc No 16 in Proceedings of the Nineteenth Session (The Hague, 
February 2002), online: <assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/gen_pd16e.pdf> [Negotiations on the 
Judgments Project].
94. Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct 746 at 760-63 (2014). 
95. See Appendix, below, s 5(b).
96. Morguard, supra note 15.
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL34
(e) there is a real and substantial connection between [enacting province or territory] 
and the facts on which the proceeding against that person is based. …
10.  Without limiting the right of the plaintiff to prove other circumstances that 
constitute a real and substantial connection between [enacting province or territory] 
and the facts on which a proceeding is based, a real and substantial connection 
between [enacting province or territory] and those facts is presumed to exist if the 
proceeding … .97
Although no symposium paper author was tasked specifically with revisiting 
the debates about whether this formulation appropriately describes the scope 
of this basis of jurisdiction, or whether the individual grounds referred to as 
presumptive real and substantial connections met this standard, various issues 
relating to this ground of jurisdiction have been taken up in the course of 
addressing other topics.  
III. DISCRETION IN ACCEPTING AND DECLINING 
JURISDICTION
A. RESIDUAL JURISDICTION: “PERSONAL OR JURIDICAL ADVANTAGE” BY 
ANOTHER NAME?
Moving beyond the main bases of jurisdiction, there is a secondary form of 
positive jurisdiction that is worth considering: that of residual jurisdiction. 
Residual jurisdiction, or “forum of necessity jurisdiction”98 is an extended or 
enlarged form of jurisdiction exercised on a discretionary basis in extraordinary 
circumstances to promote access to justice or to prevent a denial of justice. 
The concept of residual jurisdiction seems new to common law lawyers, but 
perhaps only because they have been used to seeing it in another form. At one 
time, the approach in the common law to assumed jurisdiction made residual 
jurisdiction unnecessary. The threshold for jurisdiction simpliciter in cases of service 
ex juris was very low, and excesses were controlled by a robust application of the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens. In exercising its discretion upon an application 
for a stay, the court considered whether granting a stay would unjustly deprive 
a plaintiff of a legitimate juridical or personal advantage. If so, the court would 
deny the stay even though it had concluded that it was a forum non conveniens. 
Accordingly, under this former approach, the opportunity to persuade a court 
to deny a stay served a similar function to residual jurisdiction. Its placement 
97. CJPTA, supra note 1, ss 3(e), 10. 
98. Janet Walker, “Muscutt Misplaced: The Future of Forum of Necessity Jurisdiction in Canada” 
(2009) 48:1 Can Bus LJ 135.
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at the end of a series of several steps in the jurisdictional analysis (i.e., after the 
court had considered and decided that it had jurisdiction simpliciter, and after 
the court considered and decided that there was a clearly more appropriate forum 
elsewhere) ensured that it would be exercised only in truly exceptional situations 
and after careful consideration.
However, following the perceived requirements of Morguard, as the courts 
began to restrict jurisdiction to cases in which there was a stronger connection 
between the province and the facts on which the proceeding against that party 
was based, the need for residual jurisdiction emerged. For example, in Ontario 
the rules for service outside the province contain an extensive list of grounds on 
which service may be effected without leave of the court. However, in addition 
to this, the rules contain a rarely used provision permitting service with leave 
of the court in any case not provided for in the list.99 Moreover, as the Court of 
Appeal for Ontario reasoned in Van Breda (CA), there might be good reason now 
to recognize that although certain grounds were not presumptive of a real and 
substantial connection, this did not mean that the courts ought never to consider 
exercising jurisdiction on those grounds.100
Residual jurisdiction is provided for in section 6 of the CJPTA as follows: 
A court that under section 3 lacks territorial competence in a proceeding may hear 
the proceeding despite that section if it considers that
(a) there is no court outside [enacting province or territory] in which the plaintiff 
can commence the proceeding, or
(b) the commencement of the proceeding in a court outside [enacting province or 
territory] cannot reasonably be required.101
B. POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF RESIDUAL JURISDICTION AND 
STANDARDS FOR ITS USE  
In the civil law, where jurisdiction is exercised on the basis of more strictly defined 
grounds with no forum non conveniens corrective, the need for a discretion to 
extend jurisdiction in extraordinary circumstances has been met with provisions 
such as that found in the Swiss Private International Law for forum of necessity.102 
Whether this is intended to serve as a means of correcting anomalous deficiencies 
99. RCP, supra note 22, r 17.02. 
100. Van Breda (CA), supra note 23 at para 80.
101. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 6.
102. Switzerland’s Federal Code on Private International Law (CPIL) 1 of December 
18, 1987, art 3.
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in the regular grounds for exercising jurisdiction or whether it is intended to 
address truly extraordinary circumstances is unclear. Perhaps it is both.
A provision for forum of necessity was also included in the CCQ. In Quebec, 
article 3136 provides:
Even though a Quebec authority has no jurisdiction to hear a dispute, it may 
nevertheless hear it provided the dispute has a sufficient connection with Quebec, 
if proceedings abroad prove impossible or the institution of proceedings abroad 
cannot reasonably be required.103
As mentioned earlier, in its review of the real and substantial connection 
standard in Van Breda, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recognized in principle 
the need to include this form of jurisdiction among the common law bases of 
jurisdiction. This followed, in part, from the elimination of grounds such as 
“damage sustained in the province” and “necessary or proper parties” that were 
once used in exceptional situations to permit access to the courts.104
Michael Sobkin’s symposium paper addressed the questions: “Is there a need 
for residual jurisdiction to promote access to justice for plaintiffs who cannot sue 
elsewhere and to enable other parties to be joined as necessary? What is the proper 
standard?”105 In it, Mr. Sobkin considered in detail the existing jurisprudence and 
commentary. He discussed an emerging line of cases relating to matters such as 
those involving allegations of torture by foreign state officials that the courts have 
recognized as ideally suited for this kind of jurisdiction.106 
In many such cases, it would seem unlikely for the court exercising such 
jurisdiction to be in a position to produce an internationally enforceable judgment. 
This would once have been the case with all judgments based on service ex juris 
and, in this way, might have been more easily accepted. However, under the 
approach recommended in Morguard (i.e., that courts exercise jurisdiction only in 
situations in which the resulting judgment should be enforceable internationally), 
the concern about enforceability might now be reason to question the purpose 
of exercising such extraordinary jurisdiction. One case discussed by Mr. Sobkin 
is instructive. In Bouzari v Bahremani,107 the plaintiff was the victim of torture in 
Iran and one of the defendants was a relative of a former president. For obvious 
reasons of personal safety, the plaintiff could not reasonably have been required 
to sue in Iran. And for equally obvious reasons, it would not be expected that the 
103. CCQ, supra note 19, art 3136.
104. Van Breda (CA), supra note 23 at para 72.
105. See Sobkin, supra note 9.
106. Bouzari v Bahremani, 2013 ONSC 6337, 235 ACWS (3d) 936.
107. Ibid. 
WALKER,  JUDICIAL JURISDICTION IN CANADA 37
judgment would be enforceable there. However, the acceptance of jurisdiction 
and the issuance of a judgment in default ultimately persuaded the defendant 
to participate in the proceedings, thereby suggesting that exercising jurisdiction 
served a useful purpose.108 In this way, the likelihood of the judgment being 
enforced in the defendant’s home jurisdiction was not a relevant factor to consider.
Cases such as this are truly extraordinary, and it is to be expected that the 
jurisdictional analysis would entail careful consideration of the range of concerns 
affecting the parties to ensure that jurisdiction is exercised in a properly restrained 
manner. However, as Mr. Sobkin pointed out, residual jurisdiction might also 
be used on a discretionary basis in other appropriate circumstances in cases 
in which the grounds that would once have supported jurisdiction have been 
eliminated because the events giving rise to the claim occurred outside the forum. 
In particular, Mr. Sobkin reasoned that extraordinary cases such as the Bouzari 
case may be understood as contemplated by the first phrase in the provision for 
residual jurisdiction, i.e., “there is no court outside [the province] in which the 
plaintiff can commence the proceeding.” Other cases might be understood as 
contemplated by the second phrase, i.e., “the commencement of the proceeding in 
a court outside [enacting province or territory] cannot reasonably be required.”109 
Cases of this second sort could include “damages sustained in the province” and 
“necessary or proper parties.” As the Supreme Court of Canada has observed, 
even if some bases for service outside the province accord with the real and 
substantial connection standard, “they [may] represent an expression of wisdom 
and experience drawn from the life of the law.”110 
As was discussed in connection with the Muscutt decision, the cases in which 
jurisdiction would at one time have been based on “damages sustained in the 
province” tended to be personal injury cases in which plaintiffs had returned 
home from the place of injury or settled in a place to convalesce and were not 
physically or financially able to litigate elsewhere. These cases involved injuries 
108. The defendant appealed the noting in default to the Court of Appeal for Ontario and 
brought a motion based on forum non conveniens, which was successful. See Bouzari v 
Bahremani, 2015 ONCA 275, 126 OR (3d) 223.
109. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 6(b). See also CCQ, supra note 19, art 3136. 
110. Van Breda (SCC), supra note 24 at para 83.
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suffered in traffic accidents in other provinces,111 or in negligent medical 
treatment in other provinces,112 or injuries sustained while on vacation abroad.113 
Considerable attention was given to these kinds of cases in the Muscutt and Van 
Breda decisions.
The second kind of case considered in some detail by Mr. Sobkin involved 
“necessary or proper parties.” The need to extend jurisdiction to parties related 
to claims properly before the courts arises in situations where the effective 
adjudication of the case would otherwise require more than one forum to exercise 
jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction lies severally in separate fora, there may be no one 
court capable of properly adjudicating the claim. For example, where a defendant 
wishes to claim over against a third party who is not otherwise subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court, the procedural fairness justifications for third-party 
proceedings within the forum serve equally to justify the exercise of jurisdiction 
111. Bunyan v Enns, 2010 ONSC 216, 99 OR (3d) 304 (liability witnesses in Alberta where 
highway accident occurred, damages evidence in forum, held that plaintiff’s recovery might 
be jeopardized if forced to travel to sue, stay denied); Kahlon v Cheecham, 2010 ONSC 1957, 
187 ACWS (3d) 700 (accident in British Columbia, plaintiff could not show residency in the 
forum at the time of the accident); Dennis v Farrell, 2010 ONSC 2401, 84 CCLI (4th) 64 
(liability admitted for car accident in British Columbia and damages evidence located in the 
forum; inconvenient for injured plaintiff to travel to sue); Lintner (Litigation Guardian Of) v 
Saunders, 2010 ONSC 4862, 192 ACWS (3d) 1155 (accident in British Columbia, plaintiff 
could not show residency in the forum at the time of the accident); Cardinali v Strait, 2010 
ONSC 2503, 188 ACWS (3d) 1017 (parties insured in Ontario and Michigan, respectively, 
but by same insurer).
112. Dennis v Salvation Army Grace General Hospital Board, 1997 NSCA 177, 156 NSR (2d) 
372; Oakley v Barry, 1998 NSCA 68, 166 NSR (2d) 282; O’Brien v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2002 NSCA 21, 201 NSR (2d) 338; Bouch, supra note 34; Fewer, supra note 32; 
Dembroski v Rhainds, 2011 BCCA 185, 333 DLR (4th) 437; Ayles v Arsenault, 2011 ABQB 
493, 523 AR 233.
113. Sinclair v Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc (2002), 60 OR (3d) 76, 213 DLR (4th) 
643 (CA) (members of restaurant chain located in Buffalo not required to defend slip and 
fall action in Toronto). But see Mynerich v Hampton Inns Inc, 166 ACWS (3d) 61, 2008 
CarswellOnt 1855 (WL Can) (Sup Ct) (Quebec hotel required to defend slip and fall action 
in Ontario as a result of evidence of insurance coverage); Dilkas v Red Seal Tours Inc, 2010 
ONCA 634, 104 OR (3d) 221 (where defendants’ post-accident indemnity agreement 
contemplated litigation in the forum and primary issue was quantification of damages, 
evidence of which was in the forum); Moore v Vancouver Fraser Port Authority, 2011 ONSC 
3692, 204 ACWS (3d) 278 (the port could not be expected to defend every tourist’s claim in 
the tourist’s home jurisdiction).
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over third parties elsewhere.114 In situations where a claimant may not have 
access to the defendant who bears ultimate responsibility or may not have an 
obligation to seek recovery from anyone other than an intermediate defendant, 
it could be unfair for a plaintiff to lack access to the ultimate defendant or for the 
intermediate defendant to bear the responsibility for an enforceable judgment 
pending an action to claim over the loss from the ultimate defendant.115 This may 
seem particularly unfair in cases where the ultimate defendant is an insurer.116 
Similarly, where a person suffers separate injuries in two or more fora causing 
indivisible harm, separate adjudications risk producing irreconcilable judgments. 
It may be difficult or impossible for either court to assess the respective proportions 
of harm caused by the defendants when the court has only one of the defendants 
before it. The finger pointing between the defendant who is present in each forum 
114. RCP, supra note 22, r 17.02(q). It is stated that:
A party to a proceeding may, without a court order, be served outside Ontario with an 
originating process or notice of a reference where the proceeding against the party consists of 
a claim or claims … (q) properly the subject matter of a counterclaim, crossclaim or third or 
subsequent party claim under these rules.
 For an excellent analysis of this basis of jurisdiction, see Koji Takahashi, Claims for 
Contribution and Reimbursement in an International Context: Conflict-of-laws Dimensions of 
Third Party Procedure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
115. Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA (1994), [1995] 1 AC 190, [1994] 3 WLR 926 
(PC) (interpreting governing law to permit claim over in the same proceeding); Josephson 
(Litigation Guardian of ) v Balfour Recreation Commission, 2010 BCSC 603, 10 BCLR (5th) 
369. This is to be distinguished from cases in which the defendant and the third party have 
entered into an exclusive jurisdiction agreement nominating another court (e.g., GreCon 
Dimter Inc v JR Normand Inc, 2005 SCC 46, [2005] 2 SCR 401) or there is strong reason 
for the claim against the third party to be decided elsewhere (e.g., Teck Cominco Metals Ltd v 
Lloyd’s Underwriters, 2009 SCC 11, [2009] 1 SCR 321 [Teck Cominco]).
116. Misyura v Walton, 2012 ONSC 5397, 112 OR (3d) 462; Paraie v Cangemi, 2012 ONSC 
6341, 113 OR (3d) 231; Mitchell v Jeckovich, 2013 ONSC 7494, 235 ACWS (3d) 671; 
Tamminga v Tamminga, 2014 ONCA 478, 120 OR (3d) 671; Forsythe v Westfall, 2015 
ONCA 810, 128 OR (3d) 124 (plaintiff passenger who was injured in a single car collision 
was required to sue own insurer in Ontario and was not permitted to join the defendant who 
was resident elsewhere).
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL40
and the defendant in the other forum is bound to generate inconsistencies in 
respective adjudications and to result in an incomplete recovery for the plaintiff.117
Jurisdiction over related cases is available in the European Union118 and 
continues to be available in many common law jurisdictions, such as the English 
courts.119 It used to be available in Canadian courts,120 where the grounds for 
service outside the jurisdiction were once fashioned with a view to producing 
judgments that had only local effect. In Canada, in reviewing the rules for service 
117. McNichol Estate v Woldnik (2001), 150 OAC 68, 13 CPC (5th) 61 (CA) (jurisdiction over 
one out-of-province co-defendant among several local defendants in medical malpractice 
claim); Sekela v Cordos, 2015 BCSC 732, 77 BCLR (5th) 184 (jurisdiction over foreign 
defendant declined where plaintiff injured in car accident in foreign forum and a second 
accident in the forum the next day giving rise to indivisible injuries); Mannarino v Brown 
Estate, 2015 ONSC 3167, 50 CCLI (5th) 122 (plaintiff injured in accident in the forum 
and, six weeks later, in accident in another forum; court declined jurisdiction over defendant 
in second accident finding it extremely troubling that the limitation period had now passed 
in foreign jurisdiction); Cesario v Gondek, 2012 ONSC 4563, 113 OR (3d) 466. But see Best 
v Palacios, 2016 NBCA 59, 410 DLR (4th) 367 [Best] (jurisdiction based on second accident 
in the forum exacerbating original injury declined).
118. Recast Brussels I, supra note 91, art 8. Article 8 states:
A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: 
(1) where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of 
them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear 
and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from 
separate proceedings; 
(2) as a third party in an action on a warranty or guarantee or in any other third-party 
proceedings, in the court seised of the original proceedings, unless these were instituted 
solely with the object of removing him from the jurisdiction of the court which would be 
competent in his case.
119. The Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132. Practice Direction 6(b), s 3.1(3) 
states the following:
A claim is made against a person (“the defendant”) on whom the claim form has been or 
will be served (otherwise than in reliance on this paragraph) and – (a) there is between the 
claimant and the defendant a real issue which it is reasonable for the court to try; and (b) 
the claimant wishes to serve the claim form on another person who is a necessary or proper 
party to that claim.
120. RCP, supra note 22, r 17.02(o). Rule 17.02(o) was revoked in 2014 by O Reg 43/14, 
s 6. It stated:
A party to a proceeding may, without a court order, be served outside Ontario with an 
originating process or notice of a reference where the proceeding against the party consists of a 
claim or claims … (o) against a person outside Ontario who is a necessary or proper party to a 
proceeding properly brought against another person served in Ontario.
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out to ensure that they complied with the requirement that they represent a “real 
and substantial connection,” these grounds were eliminated in places such as 
Ontario.121 In provinces where they were not eliminated, they were read down to 
conform to meet that standard.122
These situations raise challenging issues of procedural fairness in that they 
involve an exercise of jurisdiction over defendants who would otherwise not 
expect to have to defend themselves in that forum. It is important, therefore, 
that jurisdiction be exercised on a discretionary case-by-case basis to ensure, for 
example, that the forum selected is a suitable one. Courts faced with challenges 
involving parallel proceedings in these situations might also consider ways of 
coordinating the proceedings, for example, by staying the final determination 
of the matter before them until the proceeding in the other forum has been 
heard and, perhaps, the findings in the local proceeding have been taken into 
account.123 In an era in which courts feel constrained to exercise jurisdiction 
only where it will produce a judgment enforceable elsewhere, this kind of 
jurisdiction may seem problematic, but the law may need to move beyond that 
perceived restriction.124
The important point is that in situations where it would otherwise be 
warranted, the absence of jurisdiction over related claims and necessary parties is 
bound to be productive of injustice. As Mr. Sobkin concluded, there appears to 
be provision for this kind of jurisdiction in the CJPTA, and it remains only for 
the courts to re-establish the timeworn practice in the common law of exercising 
positive jurisdiction on a discretionary basis. Possible amendments to the CJPTA 
that would indicate the availability of residual jurisdiction in these situations 
together with the requirement that it be exercised in a properly restrained manner 
are indicated in the Appendix of this article.
C. DISCRETION TO DECLINE JURISDICTION: THE COMMON LAW 
LANGUISHES
One of the great common law contributions to the law of jurisdiction of the last 
century was the doctrine of forum non conveniens, under which a court having 
jurisdiction to decide a case could exercise discretion to decline jurisdiction 
121. Ibid; CJPTA (BC), supra note 2 (this Act, along with its counterparts in Saskatchewan and 
Nova Scotia, contain no provision comparable to the previous Rule 17.02(o) of the RCP).
122. Best, supra note 117.
123. Safeway Holdings (Alberta) Ltd v Cactus Ridge Estates Inc, 2016 ABQB 411, 268 ACWS (3d) 
764; Safeway Holdings (Alberta) Ltd v Cactus Ridge Estates Inc, 2014 BCSC 2237, 247 ACWS 
(3d) 690 (claim against guarantors brought in two provinces).
124. As is discussed in Part V, below.
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where there was a clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere. Unlike courts in 
the civil law, where judges have principal carriage of the matters assigned to them 
and a responsibility to see them through to their final disposition, common law 
courts have a less proactive role, which can make their process more vulnerable to 
abuse. The parties plan much of the litigation in advance of presenting it to the 
court, and, as part of this planning, plaintiffs may select a forum strategically on 
the basis that it will provide an advantage that they would not reasonably expect 
in the natural forum. This opportunism has been described as “forum shopping” 
and it has made common law courts wary of being co-opted in an unfair process. 
Although this is an inevitable by-product of party prosecution, the issue came 
to the fore only within the last fifty years as the mobility of litigants increased. 
England was one of the fora most likely to be affected because the Commercial 
Court in London had long been a leading forum for international litigation.125 
When the need to exercise discretion to decline jurisdiction became clear, and the 
test crystallized in the jurisprudence of the House of Lords, the relevant factors 
for consideration were left open-ended. This was not necessarily a flaw in the test, 
as it was meant to reflect a court’s inherent powers to prevent abuse and to have 
a cautionary effect on clever lawyering. 
As with other areas of the law, it might have been hoped that the doctrine 
would mature and the basis for exercising discretion might have become clearer 
and more structured. Some progress was made in this direction. The House of 
Lords came to recognize that the discretion needed to be applied differently in 
cases involving exclusive jurisdiction agreements from those in which more than 
one forum was suitable.126 In cases involving exclusive jurisdiction agreements, 
the court’s role in reviewing them should be limited to determining whether 
the agreement is invalid or contrary to public policy. This takes the question 
of jurisdiction out of the realm of discretion. A further question that arose in 
the early Canadian jurisprudence was whether the burden of proof should vary 
125. As a plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction, the United States was also affected. However, in the 
United States, where the right to jury trials occupies considerable public resources, the 
concerns are different from elsewhere in the common law and they have given rise to a review 
of different factors, making the jurisprudence there less relevant. See Piper Aircraft Co v 
Reyno, 454 US 235 (1981).
126. The House of Lords also identified a third kind of case: That in which a claim had been 
brought inappropriately in a forum that provided a unique remedy, which the claimant 
would not reasonably expect to receive in an appropriate forum. However, the issue arises in 
that kind of case only where it is the jurisdiction of a foreign court that is being challenged in 
an application for an anti-suit injunction and so is beyond the scope of this symposium. See 
Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel (1998), [1998] UKHL 12, [1999] 1 AC 119.
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between local defendants and those based elsewhere. At the time, the debate was 
influenced by the now superseded view that rules of service determined the scope 
of jurisdiction.127 Since then, the debate has continued in the jurisprudence.128
As Professor Elizabeth Edinger noted in her symposium paper, beyond these 
two points (the distinction between cases involving jurisdiction agreements and 
those involving another potentially more suitable forum, and the distinction 
between cases involving local and foreign defendants) there has been little progress 
made in refining the bases on which discretion is exercised and the manner in 
which it is exercised. This is the case with both the CJPTA and the common 
law. The English courts have become preoccupied with the European rules that 
they were now required to apply—rules that are heavily influenced by the civil 
law and that all but eliminate the use of discretion. And, as discussed at the 
outset of this paper, Canadian courts themselves became preoccupied with issues 
of jurisdiction simpliciter with the Muscutt and Van Breda tests which prevailed 
from 2002–2012 and which incorporated discretionary features that left little 
room for forum non conveniens analysis. As a result, over the last two decades, the 
common law of forum non conveniens has languished. 
D. STRUCTURING THE DISCRETION TO DECLINE JURISDICTION 
The structure of discretion to decline jurisdiction in cases involving jurisdiction 
agreements could be improved. In cases involving agreements exclusively 
nominating the forum in which the matter has been commenced, the court 
should have discretion to decline jurisdiction only where the agreement has been 
determined to be invalid or contrary to public policy. And in cases involving 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements, the court should base its exercise of 
discretion to accept or to decline jurisdiction on a presumption in favour of 
the forum selected by the parties. Provisions to this effect are contained in the 
suggested drafting amendments in the Appendix of this article. 
Similar considerations regarding the burden of proof could be introduced for 
jurisdiction based on the ordinary residence of the defendant and on a real and 
substantial connection between the matter and the forum. Despite the continuing 
uncertainty in the jurisprudence on this point, the better view seems to be that 
it is reasonable for a plaintiff to expect to be able to commence an action against 
a defendant in the defendant’s court, and it is for the defendant to persuade 
127. Amchem Products Incorporated v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board), [1993] 
1 SCR 897, 77 BCLR (2d) 62; Frymer v Brettschneider (1994), 19 OR (3d) 60, 115 DLR 
(4th) 744 (CA).
128. Van Breda (SCC), supra note 24 at para 103.
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the court that there is a clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere. In contrast, 
in cases involving defendants based outside the forum who have not consented to 
the forum selected by the plaintiff, it is not reasonable for a court to presume that 
it is an appropriate forum, and where the defendant objects, it is for the plaintiff 
to persuade the court that it is clearly more appropriate than the defendant’s 
own forum. On one view, jurisdiction based only on connections between the 
matter and the forum is a kind of forum conveniens (i.e., the corollary to forum 
non conveniens), and not to be presumed in the event of an objection. Possible 
amendments to the CJPTA that would provide for these various presumptions 
are indicated in the Appendix of this article.
A number of further points have emerged in the jurisprudence that could 
be codified. First, some of the disadvantages that could await a plaintiff required 
to seek relief in another forum might be mitigated by imposing terms on the 
applicant for the stay. For example, where a defendant seeks a stay in favour 
of a forum in which the defendant might raise a time bar, the defendant could 
be required as a term of granting the stay to undertake to refrain from making 
such a defence. Should a defendant who has been granted a stay fail to comply 
with the terms, the stay may be lifted and the action resumed.129 The fact that 
stays may be granted on terms is well understood in some common law systems 
and less well understood in others. A revised CJPTA might include specific 
mention of the possibility of imposing terms on the granting of a stay. Second, 
the settled view has been that the standard on which a stay is granted is that the 
proposed forum is clearly more appropriate. A revised CJPTA might include this 
qualification as well.
Third, turning to the factors themselves, five points might be mentioned. 
First, while the defendant’s participation in the proceedings is less definitive in 
precluding a request for a stay based on forum non conveniens than it is in precluding 
an objection to jurisdiction simpliciter, the nature and extent of such participation 
may be a relevant factor in determining whether the applicant should be regarded 
as having waived the right to seek a stay. Second, perhaps the most significant 
consideration will be the comparative convenience and expense for the parties. 
This will include factors such as their respective abilities to present witnesses and 
relevant documents, their relative abilities to litigate outside their home fora, and 
a myriad of other logistical considerations that are difficult to catalogue. Third, 
there may be a separate question that arises in relation to the accessibility of 
129. This is what happened in the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal with the case Quadrangle 
Holdings. In that case, the limitation period in the proposed forum was mandatory. See 
Quadrangle Holdings Ltd v Coady, 2015 NSCA 13, 355 NSR (2d) 324.
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relevant evidence. Fourth, in a common law system where foreign law must be 
pleaded and proved, the attendant expense for the parties and complexity for the 
court may militate against the exercise of jurisdiction and encourage a court to 
defer to a forum that would apply its own law to the case. Finally, the desirability 
of avoiding a multiplicity of legal proceedings and the possibility of inconsistent 
results is presented in the disjunctive in the current version of the CJPTA and 
could be expressed in the more familiar conjunctive form. 
Additional points that might be observed about the current version of the 
CJPTA are that it includes “the enforcement of an eventual judgment,”130 a point 
that could be speculative at the commencement of the matter, and the relevance 
of which has been questioned.131 Further, the generic “fair and efficient working 
of the Canadian legal system as a whole”132 could be subsumed in wording 
in the introductory paragraph that made the exercise of jurisdiction and the 
consideration of the relevant factors permissive. Suggested drafting amendments 
based on these various considerations have been included in the Appendix 
of this article.
IV. FURTHER POINTS: TRANSFERRING PROCEEDINGS, 
FAMILY LAW MATTERS, ENFORCEMENT 
A. TRANSFERRING PROCEEDINGS TO OTHER FORA
One of the more concerning legal fictions that has persisted in the common law 
is that in exercising discretion to decline jurisdiction in favour of a clearly more 
appropriate forum elsewhere, there is some assurance that the proceeding will, 
in fact, continue in the more appropriate forum. To be sure, a court may decline 
to grant a stay where it is persuaded that this would unjustly deprive the plaintiff 
of logistical or procedural benefits necessary to pursue the claim. And courts may 
impose terms on the granting of the order so as to prevent applicants from taking 
advantage of a stay to frustrate the proceedings in the proposed forum. Further, 
some actions involving forum shopping may be based on claims that are not 
viable in the natural forum. Despite this, there are a range of personal, practical, 
and juridical reasons why the granting of a stay may have the effect of bringing a 
meritorious proceeding to an end. 
130. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 11(e).
131. Chevron, supra note 43 at paras 94-95.
132. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 11(f ).
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This does not happen in changes of venue within the forum, nor does it 
happen within the Federal Court system in the United States133 or between states 
in Australia.134 In those places, the file itself is transferred and there is no need to 
commence the proceeding a second time in the new forum. Accordingly, while, 
as Vaughan Black notes in his article,135 a regime for transferring proceedings 
is different in kind from that for determining jurisdiction, it could well be 
understood as a useful adjunct within Canada to facilitate the process of ensuring 
that proceedings are decided in appropriate fora. 
As a new feature of jurisdictional law in Canada, introduced only with 
the coming into force of the CJPTA, it seemed suitable in the symposium to 
assess the progress that had been made. In his symposium paper, Professor Black 
observed that the dearth of jurisprudence on the subject suggests that it remains 
a largely uncharted area of the law. In the case law, as it exists, there does not 
appear to be any clear indication that the transfer mechanism has been assessed 
unfavourably and is being avoided: It is simply new and largely untested. And, 
as Professor Black observed, while there is no prohibition on sending proceedings 
to fora that have not adopted the CJPTA, the process of sending and receiving 
matters would seem likely to benefit from procedural rules that would clarify the 
procedure involved. These rules, of course, have not been introduced in provinces 
that have not adopted the CJPTA. As Professor Black noted, they also have 
not been introduced in any detail in provinces that have adopted the CJPTA. 
He points out that detailed rules to facilitate transfers of proceedings in child 
custody matters have been adopted in England’s Family Procedure Rules and have 
been the subject of considerable judicial interpretation.136 
Accordingly, the transfer mechanism, though useful in principle, might 
become more useful in practice if suitable rules of procedure were adopted to 
facilitate it, as has occurred in other areas of the law. Whether reform of the 
CJPTA should also seek to include either the existing or a revised version of the 
provisions for transferring proceedings is a question best left to the discretion of 
legislators in provinces interested in codifying the law of jurisdiction.
B. FAMILY MATTERS AND THE SCOPE OF THE CJPTA 
Another unfortunate legal fiction of the common law is that jurisdictional 
rules are trans-substantive, i.e., the same rules apply to all matters in personam 
133. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 USC §§ 1404, 1406 (1948).
134. Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (NSW), No 125.
135. Black, supra note 11.
136. The Family Procedure Rules 2010 (UK), SI 2010/2955.
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regardless of the subject matter in question. It is true that one feature of the 
common law different from the civil law is the tradition of maintaining courts 
of general jurisdiction, as opposed to dividing the court system into separate 
departments for different types of cases, such as private law and public law. 
However, the suggestion that the standards for jurisdiction in civil and 
commercial matters apply equally to family law matters is simply untrue. This 
is illustrated by the structure of many conflict of laws treatises. While it is 
typical to have a chapter covering the topic of judicial jurisdiction in matters 
in personam without qualification as regards the areas of law to which the 
rules apply, it is also typical to have subsequent chapters covering areas such as 
marriage, divorce, custody, and support in which the first few sections of the 
chapter outline specialized rules for jurisdiction. Confusion on the difference 
between the standards has been illustrated by the appropriation of jurisdictional 
standards developed in divorce matters for civil and commercial matters,137 and 
the application of the CJPTA to family law matters.138  
The CJPTA provides no indication of its scope of application other than to 
provide that it defers to other jurisdictional statutes. While this has the effect 
of supporting the jurisdictional regimes that are established by statutes in the 
area of family law, it has not prevented courts in CJPTA provinces from using it 
for guidance where those statutes appear to be unclear or to have gaps.139 This 
situation is to be contrasted with the CCQ, which contains a section of the 
137.  Morguard, supra note 15. The “real and substantial connection test” in Morguard was taken 
from an earlier House of Lords Decision. See Indyka v Indyka (1967), [1969] 1 AC 33, 
[1967] 3 WLR 510 (HL).
138. Anaka v Yeo, 2006 SKQB 201, 282 Sask R 279 [Anaka] (neither child’s presence in province, 
nor nominal or procedural step taken by respondent could confer jurisdiction under the 
Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act where the Children’s Law Act, 1997, SS 1997 
c C-8.2 [CLA] did not. See CJPTA (SK), supra note 2); Giles v Beisel, 2005 SKQB 390, 
20 RFL (6th) 161 (no inconsistency existed with the CLA in the provisions for determining 
the appropriate forum as the CJPTA alone contained factors for making the determination); 
Hunter v Hunter, 2005 SKCA 76, [2006] 5 WWR 141 (no inconsistency with Family 
Property Act, SS 1997, c F-6.3, s 54).
139. Anaka, supra note 138 (no jurisdiction to determine matrimonial property dispute under 
CJPTA (SK), supra note 2, where all relevant connections were to another province); Hubrich 
v Keil, 2011 BCSC 1745, 210 ACWS (3d) 476; Yonis v Garado, 2011 NSSC 110, 301 
NSR (2d) 148; Inglis v Inglis, 2012 NSSC 124, 316 NSR (2d) 75 (ordinary residence in 
province of applicant for variation sufficient despite not being included specifically in Court 
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act).
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Title on Jurisdiction that is specifically devoted to “extrapatrimonial and family 
law matters.”140 
For the symposium, Professor Martha Bailey was asked to consider, “Should 
there be a consolidated set of rules for family law matters, such as exists in 
Quebec for family law matters? What kinds of proceedings would it include?” 
Professor Bailey noted in her paper that there are fundamental constitutional 
challenges to consolidating such rules, including the fact that legislative authority 
in the field is divided between the Federal and provincial legislatures. These 
divisions complicate judicial jurisdiction, dividing it between superior courts and 
provincial courts. Moreover, in the specialized field of family law, practitioners 
are sufficiently familiar with and resigned to the byzantine structure of the law 
and the court system that they regard the possibility of a consolidated set of 
jurisdictional rules as a matter of curiosity. Nevertheless, given the complexity of 
the matter, Professor Bailey acknowledged that a consolidated listing of the various 
jurisdictional rules and where they may be found in legislation would be helpful. 
Other jurisdictional regimes, such as the Brussels I Regulation and the Choice 
of Court Convention, address this issue as one of the scope of their application. 
These regimes provide that they apply to “civil and commercial matters” (and thus 
not, for example, to family law matters) and also include provisions specifying a 
140. CCQ, supra note 19, art 3141-47. The provisions read as follows: 
3141. A Québec authority has jurisdiction to hear personal actions of an extra patrimonial and 
family nature when one of the persons concerned is domiciled in Québec.
3142. A Québec authority has jurisdiction to rule on the custody of a child provided he is 
domiciled in Québec.
3143. A Québec authority has jurisdiction to decide cases of support or applications for review 
of a foreign judgment which may be recognized in Québec respecting support when one of the 
parties has his domicile or residence in Québec.
3144. A Québec authority has jurisdiction in matters relating to nullity of marriage when 
one of the spouses has his domicile or residence in Québec or when the marriage was 
solemnized in Québec.
3145. As regards the effects of marriage, particularly those which are binding on all spouses, 
regardless of their matrimonial regime, a Québec authority has jurisdiction when one of the 
spouses has his domicile or residence in Québec.
3146. A Québec authority has jurisdiction to rule on separation from bed and board when 
one of the spouses has his domicile or residence in Québec at the time of the institution of 
the proceedings.
3147. A Québec authority has jurisdiction matters of filiation if the child or one of his parents 
is domiciled in Québec.
It has jurisdiction in matters of adoption if the child or plaintiff is domiciled in Québec.
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range of areas to which they do not apply.141 Although it may not seem necessary 
to delimit the scope of the CJPTA in such detail, the CJPTA currently contains 
no indication of its scope apart from providing that it gives way to other statutes 
that codify jurisdiction:
If there is a conflict or inconsistency between this Part and another Act of [enacting 
province or territory] or of Canada that expressly
(a) confers jurisdiction or territorial competence on a court, or
(b) denies jurisdiction or territorial competence to a court, 
that other Act prevails.142
141. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 62, art 2(2). The provision reads as follows: 
This Convention shall not apply to the following matters –
a) the status and legal capacity of natural persons; 
b) maintenance obligations; 
c) other family law matters, including matrimonial property regimes and other rights or 
obligations arising out of marriage or similar relationships; 
d) wills and succession; 
e) insolvency, composition and analogous matters; 
f ) the carriage of passengers and goods; 
g) marine pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, general average, and emergency 
towage and salvage; 
h) anti-trust (competition) matters; 
i) liability for nuclear damage; 
j) claims for personal injury brought by or on behalf of natural persons; 
k) tort or delict claims for damage to tangible property that do not arise from a 
contractual relationship; 
l) rights in rem in immovable property, and tenancies of immovable property; 
m) the validity, nullity, or dissolution of legal persons, and the validity of decisions 
of their organs; 
n) the validity of intellectual property rights other than copyright and related rights; 
o) infringement of intellectual property rights other than copyright and related rights, except 
where infringement proceedings are brought for breach of a contract between the parties 
relating to such rights, or could have been brought for breach of that contract; 
p) the validity of entries in public registers.
142. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 12. 
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL50
A moderate approach to the challenge of clarifying the scope of the CJPTA 
could be to specify simply that the Act applies to civil and commercial matters, 
and to retain the subordination provision excerpted above. 
C. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CJPTA: ENFORCEABILITY OF CJPTA 
JUDGMENTS ELSEWHERE
The Morguard approach to the law of jurisdiction has been understood to imply 
an approach to the recognition and enforcement of judgments in which the 
enforcing court has a reduced mandate to review the jurisdiction of the issuing 
court. In the United States, under the Full Faith and Credit obligation of Article 
IV.1 of the Constitution, enforcing courts must grant full faith and credit 
(i.e., accept) the judgments of other courts in the United States not only as to 
the merits of the dispute, but also to the courts’ determinations of their own 
jurisdiction.143 This is a departure from the general approach under the common 
law. In the European Union, under the Brussels I Regulation, the approach is 
also different from the common law in that the obligation to enforce judgments 
issued in Europe is independent of whether the issuing court complied with the 
jurisdictional rules of the Regulation.
In her symposium paper, Professor Angela Swan responded to the question, 
“Will the judgments of courts exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the CJPTA be 
enforceable in other provinces and countries (and are either compatible with 
Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye)?” Noting that the companion statute to 
the CJPTA, the Enforcement of Canadian Judgments Act,144 eliminates review of 
the issuing court’s jurisdiction in an enforcement action, Professor Swan argued 
that the Morguard decision spoke of a constitutional requirement for courts to 
exercise properly restrained jurisdiction, but did not eliminate the possibility of 
jurisdictional review by the enforcing court. 
As will be considered next in Part IV(D), for the common law in Canada, 
this is but one of the concerns raised by the approach to the law of jurisdiction 
and judgments that has emerged in the generation of jurisprudence since the 
Morguard decision.145
143. Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 10, 12 (1982); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
§§ 96-97 (1971).
144. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Enforcement of Canadian Judgments and Decrees Act, 
online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/home/333-josetta-1-en-gb/uniform-actsa/enforcement-of-canadian-
judgments-decrees-act/4-enforcement-of-canadian-judgments-and-decrees-act>. 
145. See Part V, below.
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D. INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION AND THE TROUBLE WITH DOUBLE 
CONVENTIONS
One of the main incentives for pursuing jurisdictional reform is the desire to 
align or to coordinate local jurisdictional regimes with international standards. 
This facilitates the international recognition and enforcement of judgments.146 
Accordingly, any assessment of the progress to date of the CJPTA and its promise 
for the future, if adopted more widely in the common law provinces of Canada, 
should consider how it would operate in the larger international context. 
The jurisdictional reforms brought about by the Morguard decision (i.e., 
to recognize and enforce judgments against defendants served abroad who 
did not consent to jurisdiction and did not defend) were initially advanced 
as standards for defendants served ex juris in other parts of Canada. However, 
Canadian courts found no reason to refrain from applying this more generous 
approach to the judgments of foreign courts as well, despite the fact that courts 
in other countries would not enforce judgments from Canadian courts where 
jurisdiction ex juris had been exercised on this basis (i.e., over non-consenting 
defendants who did not participate in the proceedings). In the case of courts in 
civil law countries, their jurisdictional statutes did not provide for recognition on 
this basis, and in the case of common law courts, leading courts in England and 
Ireland rejected it.147
Nevertheless, the view that the way forward in cross-border litigation was 
to develop regimes for both jurisdiction and judgments so as to correlate them 
was widely accepted. At the same time that the Canadian legal community 
was beginning to explore this new approach, the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law was initiating a project to develop a multilateral judgments 
convention. The Hague Conference delegates considered whether they should 
negotiate a simple convention that would deal only with the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments; a double convention, with standards both for 
jurisdiction and for judgments; or a mixed convention that included further 
jurisdictional grounds that did not give rise to an obligation to enforce. Ultimately, 
146. Morguard, supra note 15 at 1100. This coordination was demonstrated in the Morguard 
analysis itself, in which judgments enforcement was the driver, as was the case in the United 
States in which Full Faith and Credit prompted review of the law of judicial jurisdiction, 
and in the European Union in which the provision requiring the member states to negotiate 
a judgments enforcement regime prompted the development of a “double convention,” i.e., 
one that included a regime for jurisdiction as well.
147. In re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd, [2012] IESC 12, [2012] 1 IR 722; Rubin v Eurofinance SA, 
[2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236.
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the Hague Conference delegates decided that they needed to negotiate a double 
convention that regulated jurisdictional standards in the courts of countries that 
adopted it and also imposed an obligation on those courts to enforce judgments 
from other courts that had adopted the convention. 
This approach had a clear track record in the European Union in the Brussels 
1 Regulation.148 The member states of the European Union had been instructed 
in the original Treaty of Rome to develop a regime for the mutual recognition of 
judgments and it had seemed convenient to them to achieve this result by also 
establishing harmonized rules for jurisdiction.149 
As Joost Blom explained in his paper, the Hague Conference delegates 
pursued this approach until it became clear in 2002 that they would be unable 
to agree on the regime for jurisdiction.150 The Special Commission (of the Hague 
Conference) reviewed the progress and decided to re-group and pursue, through 
an informal Working Group, a much narrower convention—one that was 
limited to business-to-business disputes in which the parties had complied with 
a forum selection clause. That convention was completed in 2005 and was called 
the Choice of Court Convention.151 It has been adopted in a number of countries 
and has begun to be adopted in some Canadian provinces.
Useful though this Choice of Court Convention may be, it covers only a 
small range of the kinds of cross-border cases that arise. Accordingly, the Hague 
Conference has continued to pursue the possibility of a convention of broader 
application through the work of an Experts’ Group. Against this background, 
Professor Blom was asked to consider, “How might the CJPTA function in light 
of the current Hague Conference multilateral judgments convention project and, 
ultimately, one harmonizing judicial jurisdiction?”
One of the most striking features of the current work of the Hague 
Conference is that the Experts’ Group abandoned the aspiration to produce a 
double convention and, instead sought to draft a single convention. As Professor 
Blom noted, a convention harmonizing jurisdiction may well gain momentum 
in time, but that is likely to be a number of years away. In contrast, a single 
convention is one in which there is an obligation to recognize and enforce 
148. The European Union originally published the Brussels Convention in 1968, followed by the 
Brussels I Regulation in 2001, which was revised in 2012. See 1968 Brussels Convention on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [1968] OJ, L 299 
[Brussels Convention]; Brussels I Regulation, supra note 91; Recast Brussels I, supra note 91.
149.  P Jennard, “Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (Signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968)” [1968] OJ, C 59/01.
150. See Blom, supra note 13.
151. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 62. 
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judgments from the courts of other member states where the courts have 
exercised jurisdiction on specified bases. It does not purport to regulate direct 
jurisdiction. It does not specify which jurisdictional grounds a court may or may 
not rely upon in exercising jurisdiction. It merely provides that where a court 
has exercised jurisdiction on one of the specified grounds, there is an obligation 
to enforce the resulting judgment. Where a court has exercised jurisdiction on 
another ground, another court may decide to enforce the judgment in any event, 
but there is no obligation to do so.
This kind of regime is familiar to common law courts. It is the basis on which 
they have operated for over a century, and it is the basis on which Canadian 
common law courts operated until the Morguard decision was interpreted as 
requiring them to do otherwise. Moreover, to promote wide adoption of the 
convention, the Experts’ Group has established a range of jurisdictional grounds 
that feature in most common law systems. As Professor Blom notes, an assessment 
of the CJPTA in light of this convention could become a point of considerable 
practical importance. Chief among the reasons for this is that the proposed 
Hague judgments convention may come to be adopted by Canada’s trading 
partners. Should this occur, it would be desirable for Canada also to adopt it and 
gain the benefit of the opportunities for the recognition of Canadian judgments 
that membership would bring. 
To gain the benefit of membership in the convention, it would be very 
helpful if there were means of demonstrating clearly which judgments issued 
by Canadian courts would be eligible for enforcement. To be clear, it is the 
judgment in question that is reviewed on enforcement, and not the judgments 
regime as a whole. However, the prospect of conducting individual reviews of 
the jurisdictional basis of each judgment sought to be enforced could become 
cumbersome where no jurisdictional analysis is undertaken by the issuing court. 
Where that court is in a common law province that has not adopted the CJPTA, 
the basis on which the court exercises jurisdiction is not generally reviewed unless 
it is challenged. 
In courts of provinces that have adopted the CJPTA, it would be helpful to 
clarify any grounds that may seem to depart from the eligible grounds listed in 
the convention. Professor Blom conducted just such a review in his article, and 
evaluated the extent to which each of the CJPTA jurisdictional bases are “Hague 
compliant.”152 He also suggested that the fact that the CJPTA is not entirely 
“Hague compliant” is not necessarily a reason to revise the bases of jurisdiction 
152. Blom, supra note 13 at 272.
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found in the CJPTA. It is clarity as to which bases meet the standards of the 
Hague convention that is most useful.
This, in many respects, is one of the features of the convention that represents 
its greatest promise for success. As a single convention, it does not impose a 
jurisdictional regime on the legal systems of member states. It does not contain 
a “black list” of grounds that a member state’s court may not use, such as was 
contained in the judgments convention proposal that failed some fifteen years 
ago,153 and such as has been sought to be achieved piecemeal by Canadian courts 
since Morguard. The proposed Hague convention deals only with the question of 
whether, in the case of the judgment sought to be enforced, the court exercised 
jurisdiction on one of the permitted bases. The effect of the currently proposed 
convention on member states’ legal systems is limited to that necessary for the 
required result—the increased recognition and enforcement of judgments.
V. THE CJPTA IN THE DECADE AHEAD
The change in approach at the Hague Conference has other less immediate, 
but potentially more significant, implications. These relate to the intellectual 
inspiration that it might provide for the law in the years ahead. 
The last twenty-five years of legal analysis in the field of judicial jurisdiction 
has been preoccupied with the challenges of tailoring the grounds of jurisdiction 
exercised by courts in Canada to meet a standard perceived to be a well-accepted 
basis for a judgment that should be granted recognition and enforcement in other 
courts. This unrelenting focus on correlating the two jurisdictional standards has 
created new restrictions on jurisdiction that seem to serve no other purpose. 
Whether justified as constitutional imperatives or comity, these restrictions have 
produced hard cases and bad law.
While many of the grounds of jurisdiction exercised by Canadian courts have 
passed muster, this has been little comfort for litigants with meritorious claims 
that have been dismissed due to the elimination of grounds that have regarded 
inconsistent with the perceived dictates of the Supreme Court in Morguard. 
Long established jurisdictional bases that were once relatively uncontroversial 
came under fire. This was despite the fact that an exercise of these grounds of 
jurisdiction would in any event have been subject to the discretion of the court 
to decline jurisdiction where it was a forum non conveniens, and that the exercise 
of jurisdiction would not have been relied upon to produce an internationally 
153. Negotiations on the Judgments Project, supra note 93. 
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enforceable judgment. To those committed to the goal of correlating direct 
and indirect jurisdiction, exercising jurisdiction beyond a real and substantial 
connection154 was inconceivable. 
And yet there have been occasions when the courts have declined to be 
governed by this imperative. Two notable examples are worth mention. First, 
in a regime based on correlativity, there is no justification for refusing to 
enforce a judgment from a court exercising jurisdiction on the basis of a real 
and substantial connection other than for extraordinary reasons, such as public 
policy. Parallel proceedings produce a “race to judgment.” The race to judgment 
cannot be avoided in any systematic way without imposing a strict rule that the 
judgment of the court first seised of the matter alone is entitled to recognition 
and enforcement. The only alternative is for one of the courts to take action to 
eliminate the multiplicity by granting a stay of its own proceeding or issuing an 
injunction restraining the continuation of the other proceeding. 
However, as was illustrated in a situation in one case that came before the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 2009,155 sometimes, neither of these options are 
appropriate. Proceedings had been commenced on the same day in Canada and 
in the United States, and there was good reason for the proceeding commenced 
in Canada to continue—and no justification for issuing an injunction to restrain 
the foreign proceeding. A decision to let the parallel proceedings continue seemed 
to fly in the face of the dictates of a regime inspired by the ideals of a double 
convention on which Canadian jurisdictional law had implicitly been based. 
Such a regime, as exists under the Brussels I Regulation, requires the elimination 
of a multiplicity of proceedings and the potential for inconsistent results. And 
yet the Supreme Court stood its ground and declined to impose a ruling that was 
unsuitable under the circumstances. 
Second, in Chevron, the SCC held that a real and substantial connection 
between the matter and the forum was not required for a court to exercise 
jurisdiction to decide whether a foreign judgment was enforceable in Canada.156 
The Court reasoned that such an action did not involve the adjudication of the 
merits of the claim or the aspiration that the results would have more than local 
effect. The Court disagreed with some commentators (e.g., Pitel) who said that the 
need for a separate jurisdictional basis was established by Morguard.157 Together 
154. As proposed in Walker, “Muscutt Quintet,” supra note 29. 
155. Teck Cominco, supra note 115.
156. Chevron, supra note 43. 
157. See Stephen GA Pitel & Nicholas S Rafferty, Conflict of Laws (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 
159-160 cited in ibid at paras 66-67.
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with “damages sustained in the province” and “necessary and proper parties”, 
this reflected a third situation in which the courts’ jurisdiction over foreign 
non-consenting parties was not limited to cases having a real and substantial 
connection to the forum.
These two decisions, together with the leading decisions on jurisdiction in 
cases of service ex juris, have highlighted both the strength and the weakness of 
the common law as a means of creating a jurisdictional regime. On the one hand, 
attempting to create a complete jurisdictional regime out of the obiter in discrete 
cases has produced many anomalies. These anomalies have in turn given rise to 
some significant jurisprudence that has been, at best, confusing and, at worst, 
unhelpful. On the other hand, there have been occasions when leading courts 
have been confronted with the logical implications of the emerging doctrine and, 
realizing that the results would be undesirable, have refused to be governed by it. 
The conclusions to be drawn from the individual papers presented at the 
symposium are too many and too varied to summarize here, but some common 
themes emerge. First among these is that “a statutory codification would make 
the law more available and more knowable, not just to lawyers but to the 
general public.”158 Second, even if the differences between the CJPTA and the 
common law are not significant, their existence exacerbates the confusion and 
uncertainty within this area of law. Third, while the CJPTA may need some 
updating, the provisions that require attention and the attention that they require 
are relatively clear. Fourth, the international community is pressing forward 
with the development of new regimes for the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments, regimes in which it would be beneficial for Canada to participate. 
While these regimes do not appear to require significant changes to the current 
law of jurisdiction in Canada, they highlight the importance of aspiring to make 
our law more available and more knowable to lawyers and to the general public, 
both in Canada and elsewhere. 
The adoption of the CJPTA by the remaining common law provinces 
might not be a complete solution to the challenges that we face with the law of 
jurisdiction. However, as a regime, the CJPTA could provide a sound starting 
point for the development—perhaps by the ULCC—of a revised model statute 
that would serve Canadians well in the decade ahead. Some drafting suggestions 
for such a revised model statute on court jurisdiction are contained in the 
Appendix that follows.
 
158. Pitel, supra note 5 at 78.
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VI. APPENDIX: COURT JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS 
TRANSFER ACT—SUGGESTED DRAFTING AMENDMENTS
PART 2: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION159
Application of this Part
2.(1) In this Part, “court” means a court of [enacting province or territory].
(2) The jurisdiction of a court in civil and commercial matters is to be determined 
solely by reference to this Part.
(3) For greater certainty, except as provided in this Part, this Part does not apply to 
family law matters, including divorce, custody, support, or matrimonial property.160
Proceedings in personam
3.(1) A court has jurisdiction in a proceeding that is brought against a person only if
(a) that person is the plaintiff in another proceeding in the court to which the 
proceeding in question is a counterclaim,
(b) during the course of the proceeding that person submits to the court’s 
jurisdiction by defending the merits of the proceeding,161
(c) there is an agreement between the plaintiff and that person to the effect that 
the court has jurisdiction in the proceeding,
(d) that person is ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory] at the 
time of the commencement of the proceeding, or
(e) there is a real and substantial connection between [enacting province or 
territory] and the facts on which the proceeding against that person is based.
3.(2) However, a court of [enacting province or territory] has no jurisdiction 
where the parties, by valid agreement, have chosen to submit all existing or future 
159. The term “judicial jurisdiction” is the prevailing term internationally.
160. Clarifying the scope of the statute to exclude family members avoids the confusion in this 
area arising from considering whether jurisdiction is conferred differently in another statute. 
This approach to family law matters is consistent with the approach elsewhere in both civil 
and common law. See CCQ, supra note 19; Recast Brussels I, supra note 91, art 1; Lawrence 
Collins, ed, Dicey, Morris & Collins on The Conflict of Laws, 15th ed (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2017) at ch 17-21.
161. This phrase clarifies the basis for determining “submission” or “attornment.”
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disputes between themselves relating to a specified legal relationship exclusively 
to a foreign court or to an arbitrator,162 unless 
(a) the defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the court of [enacting province 
or territory] or
(b) the jurisdiction agreement purports to serve as a waiver of the territorial 
competence of the courts of [enacting province or territory] by a consumer or 
worker or insured party ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory].163
[Section 4 is omitted]164
Proceedings in rem
4.   A court has jurisdiction in a proceeding that is brought against a vessel if the 
vessel is served or arrested in [enacting province or territory].
Ordinary residence – legal persons165
5. A legal person is ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory], for the 
purposes of this Part, only if
(a)   it is incorporated in [enacting province or territory] or
(b)   it has its principal place of business in [enacting province or territory] or
(c)   its central management is exercised in [enacting province or territory.166
Real and substantial connection
6. Without limiting the right of the plaintiff to prove other circumstances that 
constitute a real and substantial connection between [enacting province or 
territory] and the facts on which a proceeding is based, a real and substantial 
connection between [enacting province or territory] and those facts is presumed 
to exist if the proceeding
162. This provision establishes a negative jurisdiction provision for exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements nominating other fora such as exists in Quebec (see CCQ, supra note 19, art 
3148, para 2) and the European Union (see Recast Brussels I, supra note 91, art 11). See also 
discussion in Saumier, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
163. This provision clarifies that the negative jurisdiction provision applies only to commercial 
agreements. See discussion of Saumier, supra note 7 and surrounding text.
164. Section 4 (“proceedings with no nominate defendant”) has been omitted as having never 
been proven to be of use.
165. Separate provisions for partnerships and unincorporated associations are replaced by a single 
provision for “legal persons.”
166. The provision for jurisdiction over legal persons having or required by law to have a 
registered office or agent in the enacting province is omitted as confusing service with 
judicial jurisdiction.
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(a) is brought to enforce, assert, declare or determine proprietary or possessory 
rights or a security interest in immovable or movable property in [enacting 
province or territory],
(b) concerns the administration of the estate of a deceased person in relation to
(i) immovable property of the deceased person in [enacting province or territory], or
(ii) movable property anywhere of the deceased person if at the time of death he 
or she was ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory],
(c) is brought to interpret, rectify, set aside or enforce any deed, will, contract or 
other instrument in relation to
(i) immovable or movable property in [enacting province or territory], or
(ii) movable property anywhere of a deceased person who at the time of death 
was ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory],
(d) is brought against a trustee in relation to the carrying out of a trust in any of 
the following circumstances:
(i) the trust assets include immovable or movable property in [enacting province 
or territory] and the relief claimed is only as to that property;
(ii) that trustee is ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory];
(iii) the administration of the trust is principally carried on in [enacting 
province or territory];
(iv) by the express terms of a trust document, the trust is governed by the law of 
[enacting province or territory],
(e) concerns contractual obligations, and
(i) the contractual obligations, to a substantial extent, were to be performed in 
[enacting province or territory],
(ii) by its express terms, the contract is governed by the law of [enacting 
province or territory];
(f ) concerns
(i) the purchase of goods, services or both, for use other than in the course of 
the purchaser’s trade or profession, and resulted from a solicitation of business in 
[enacting province or territory] by or on behalf of the seller;
(ii)  the employment of a worker whose ordinary residence is in [enacting 
province or territory]; or
(iii) insurance where the holder, the insured or the beneficiary is ordinarily 
resident in [enacting province or territory], the contract is related to [enacting 
province or territory] or the loss occurred in [enacting province or territory].167
167. The provision securing access to the courts of a consumer’s province residence is extended to 
workers and insured persons. See discussion of Saumier, supra note 7 and surrounding text.
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(g) concerns restitutionary obligations that, to a substantial extent, arose in 
[enacting province or territory],168
(h) concerns a tort committed in [enacting province or territory],
(i) is a claim for an injunction ordering a party to do or refrain from doing anything
(i) in [enacting province or territory], or
(ii) in relation to immovable or movable property in [enacting province or territory],
(j) is for a determination of the personal status or capacity of a person who is 
ordinarily resident in [enacting province of territory],
(k) is for enforcement of a judgment of a court made in or outside [enacting 
province or territory] or an arbitral award made in or outside [enacting province 
or territory], or
(l) is for the recovery of taxes or other indebtedness and is brought by the Crown 
[of the enacting province or territory] or by a local authority [of the enacting 
province or territory].
Discretion as to the exercise of jurisdiction:
Residual jurisdiction
7.(1) A court that under section 3 lacks judicial jurisdiction in a proceeding may 
in exceptional circumstances exercise discretion to169 hear the proceeding despite 
that section if it considers that
(a) there is no court outside [enacting province or territory] in which the plaintiff 
can commence the proceeding, or
(b) the commencement of the proceeding in a court outside [enacting province 
or territory] cannot reasonably be required, or
(c) it is necessary to exercise jurisdiction over the claim or the party in order 
to decide a closely related matter over which the court has judicial jurisdiction 
pursuant to section 3(a), (b), (c) or (d).170
168. The provision for jurisdiction over “business carried on in the province” is omitted as either 
redundant or exorbitant. See Walsh, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
169. This phrase clarifies the high threshold for the exercise of residual jurisdiction. See discussion 
of Sobkin, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
170. This phrase re-introduces the traditional provision for the exercise of jurisdiction over 
necessary and proper parties such as continues to exist in Quebec, but clarifies that it is 
subject to the same high threshold as the exercise of residual jurisdiction more generally. See 
CCQ, supra note 19, art 3136 at para 2; Recast Brussels I, supra note 91, art 8; Sobkin, supra 
note 9 and accompanying text.
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7.(2) In exercising residual jurisdiction under this section, the court must consider 
the interests of the parties to the proceeding and the ends of justice.171
Discretion as to the exercise of jurisdiction:
Declining jurisdiction
8.(1) In proceedings in which the exercise of territorial jurisdiction is based on 
section 3.(1)(c),
(a) and the jurisdiction of the courts of [the enacting province] is agreed to be 
exclusive, a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction only where the agreement 
is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, or where giving 
effect to the agreement would be manifestly unjust or contrary to public policy;
(b) and the jurisdiction of the court chosen is agreed to be non-exclusive, the 
court will base its exercise of discretion to accept or to decline jurisdiction on a 
presumption in favour of the forum selected by the parties.172
8.(2) In proceedings in which the exercise of territorial jurisdiction is based on 
section 3(d) or on section 3(e), or on section 3(c) where the agreement does not 
grant exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of [enacting province or territory],173 
a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction on such terms as are just where there 
is a clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere that is available and adequate,174 
where it is in the interests of justice to do so, based on: 
(a) the participation of the applicant in the proceedings,
(b) the comparative convenience and expense for the parties to the proceeding 
and for their witnesses, in litigating in the court or in an alternative forum,
(b) the accessibility of evidence required in the proceeding in the courts of 
[enacting province or territory] or in an alternative forum,175
171. This provision clarifies the need to consider the effect of exercising residual jurisdiction on 
both parties and the broad ranging consideration of factors necessary to the appropriately 
restrained exercise of residual jurisdiction. See discussion of Sobkin, supra note 9 and 
accompanying text. 
172. This clarifies the standard to be applied in cases in which jurisdiction is based on a 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement.
173. The exercise of discretion to decline jurisdiction is eliminated for cases in which jurisdiction 
is exercised on the basis of a valid exclusive jurisdiction agreement.
174. The addition of this phrase clarifies the test for “more appropriate” in a manner consistent 
with prevailing international standards.
175. This provision incorporates the commonly used factor relating to the accessibility of 
relevant evidence.
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL62
(d) the law to be applied to issues in the proceeding or176
(e) the desirability of avoiding a multiplicity of legal proceedings and the potential 
for177 conflicting decisions in different courts.
8.(3) In proceedings in which the exercise of jurisdiction is based on section 3(1)
(e), the court shall not presume that it is the more appropriate forum.178
8.(4) The court may refuse to decline to exercise jurisdiction where this would 
deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate juridical or personal benefit of proceeding in 
the courts of [enacting province or territory].179
Conflicts or inconsistencies with other Acts
9. If there is a conflict or inconsistency between this Part and another Act of 
[enacting province or territory] or of Canada that expressly
(a) confers jurisdiction on a court, or
(b) denies jurisdiction to a court, 
that other Act prevails.180
176. This provision clarifies that the factors justifying the exercise of discretion to decline 
jurisdiction are disjunctive and not conjunctive.
177. This phrase combines two typically coinciding factors. 
178. This provision clarifies the standard to be applied in cases in which jurisdiction is based on a 
real and substantial connection to the forum.
179. This provision codifies the prevailing standard for refusing to decline jurisdiction in favour of 
a forum otherwise determined to be clearly more appropriate.
180. Part 3 concerning Transfers of Proceedings is not addressed here; see discussion of Black, 
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
